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Wimberly: The Labor Injunction--Past, Present, and Future

THE LABOR INJUNCTION-PAST, PRESENT,
AND FUTURE
JAMES W.

WnMERLY, JR.*

I. INTRODUCTION
The injunction had been used to break a strike; to take
one side of an issue; to determine wages... and standards of living by the brute force of judicial powerinstead of leaving it to a matter of adjustment by free
American workers.**
[But,] [als labor organizations grew in strength and
developed toward maturity, congressional emphasis
shifted from protection of the nascent labor movement
to the encouragement of collective bargaining and to
administrative techniques for the peaceful resolution of
industrial disputes. This shift in emphasis was accomplished, however, without extensive revision of many
of the older enactments, including the anti-injunction
section of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Thus it became
the task of the courts to accommodate, to reconcile the
older statutes with the more recent ones.***
A. History
The earliest reported American labor case was tried in 1806
when the Philadelphia cordewainers were indicted for striking
for higher wages. The case held the association of employees for
the purpose of raising wages to be a criminal conspiracy.' Later,
criminal prosecutions fell into disuse, partly as the result of the
adverse decision in ComaonweaZth v. Hunt2 and partly because
of public opinion. On the civil side, however, the volume of labor
litigation sharply increased. Suits were grounded on various tort
theories such as nuisance, trespass, and interference with advantageous relationship, as well as the Sherman Act. Under the
prima facie tort doctrine and the Sherman Act, the legitimacy
* B.B.A. cun laude, University of Georgia; LL.B., University of Georgia
School of Law; LL.M., Harvard Law School; formerly with Hull, Towill,
Norman, Barrett, & Johnson, Augusta, Georgia, and Office of the Solicitor,
Dep't of Labor, Washington, D.C.; presently Law Instructor, U.S. Army
Military Police School, Fort Gordon, Georgia.
** 75 Coxro. REc. 5480 (1932) (Remarks of Rep. La Guardia).
*** Boys Market v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 251 (1970).

1. Commonwealth v. Pullis, 3 Commons & Sinore, Soc. Hist. Am. Soc.
59-248 (1910).
2. 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1842).
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of union conduct was required to meet the "objectives test": if
the union's objective appeared to the judge to be lawful, only
then would he refuse a temporary restraining order. Moreover,
even if the objectives were found to be legitimate, economic
pressure could only be exerted through means receiving judicial
acceptance. The 'legal doctrines in the labor cases were often
illusory and ambiguous and tended to reflect the economic and
social views of the judges who applied them.3

The foundation of this judicial regulation was the labor injunction. Damages had proved unsatisfactory to employers, 4
while the injunction offered swift and comprehensive relief. A
temporary restraining order against the union could be obtained
within a matter of hours.5 Once the injunction was granted, the
strikers' fervor was abated, and the strike was lost. That the
injunction successfully broke strikes can be seen from the fact
that they were rarely appealed and the fact that permanent
injunctions were rarely sought. 6 Moreover, violators of the order
3. Professor Gregory has explained the situation in the following manner:
A referee of a boxing match applies a set of arbitrary rules to
the fighters; but he would never think of making up such rules as
he goes along or even of introducing into his decisions long-felt
personal notions of what he believes is fair in the ring. Referees of
sporting contests accept and conform to a set of legislated rules
....
Courts are expected traditionally to behave in much the
same fashion.... For any modifications of them strike at very
fundamental social policy and should be considered and debated by
our traditional policy-makling branch of government. In this way
such changes will become the resultant of all social opinion and
will not tend merely to reflect the notions of a few judges, which
vary from man to man...
But perhaps the most alarming feature of the labor injunction
... was the ease with which its use increasingly tempted judges
to dispense with any well-founded theory of illegality.... They
came to look at much of organized labor's economic coercive activity as enjoinable in itself, without bothering to find or to state in
their opinions that it was also unlawful.... It seemed to lead
many courts to grant sweeping injunctions on the basis of personal
or class dislike of organized labor's economic program instead of in
accordance with settled standards of law. A process of this sort lent
itself admirably to the use of the illegal purpose doctrine.
GREaORY, LABOR AND TiE LAw 91-104 (2nd rev. ed. 1961).
4. Unions were often judgment-proof; there were procedural difficulties in
suing labor organizations as entities; juries were available to the defendant
unions; and such actions rarely provided relief until long after the dispute was
over. Note, Labor Injunctionw and Judge-Made Labor Law: The Contemporary Role of Norris-La Guardia, 70 YALE L.. 70, 72 (1960).
5. See Wim, THE GovERNMENT IN LABOR DisPuTEs 90 (1932).
6. For example, there were 118 reported applications for injunction in the
Federal courts between the years 1900 and 1927. Nine were denied, but there
were only 33 appeals from the restraining orders. FRANxFURTER & GRMENE,
TnE LABOR INJUNCriOx, Apps. 1 & 3 (1930). Of the 88 temporary injunctions reported from 1901-1928, only 32 reached the permanent injunction stage.
Witte, supra note 4, at 79.
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might be subject to criminal and civil contempt proceedings held
without a jury and before the same judge who had issued the
original decree.7
The initial stages of the injunctive process were particularly
subject to procedural inadequacies. The severity of the problem
is illustrated by Frankiuter and Greene who reported the following data in 1930:
Of the one hundred and eighteen cases reported in
the federal courts during the last 27 years, not less than
seventy ex parts restraining orders were granted without notice to the defendants or opportunity to be heard.
In but 12 of these instances, was the bill of complaint
accompanied by supporting affidavits; in the remaining 58 cases, the court's interdict issued upon the mere
submission of a bill expressing conventional formulas,
8
frequently even without a verification.
Nor were these the only criticisms against the labor injunction.
A major criticism was that injunctions were essentially repressive in the sense that they required the employees to desist from
using the most effective form of self-help but did nothing to
solve the underlying problems that drove men first to organize
and then strike." Perhaps the sharpest accusation was that the
courts had one law for business combinations but another for
labor unions. 1°
Moreover, the number of labor injunctions greatly increased
after the Debs" decision in 1895. In the 1880's, twenty-eight
injunctions were issued; after the Debs decision, 122 were issued
in 1890's; 328 were issued from 1900 to 1909; and 446 were issued
from 1910 to

1919.12

Thus, the use of the injunction in labor dis-

putes flourished in state and federal courts and led to the characterization of the period as the era of "Law by injunction."' 3
The use of labor injunctions by the judiciary was not without
protest. Aftr the Debs injunction, the 1896 Democratic platform
contained these words:
7. See Wirr, supra note 4, at 100-01.
8. FRANKFURTER & GREENE, sopra note 5, at 64.
9. Cox, The Role of Law in Labor Disputes, 39 CoRNiELL L.Q. 592, 595

(1954).
10. Id.

11. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
12. WrrrE, supra note 4, at 84.
13. See S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1932).
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We denounce arbitrary interference by Federal
authorities in local affairs as a violation of the Constitution of the United States and a crime against free
institutions, and we especially object to government by
injunction as a new and highly dangerous form of oppression by which Federal Judges, in contempt of the
become at once
laws of the states and rights of citizens,
14
legislators, judges and executioners.
By 1908, the platforms of both the Democratic and Republican
parties had planks against the unbridled use of the labor injunction. Bills were introduced in each session of Congress for
twenty years, from 1894 until 1914, to this effect.
In 1912, Wilson was elected President on the promise of a lNew
Freedom. This campaign pledge of a lew Freedom resulted,
among other things, in the Clayton Act of 1914.
Section 6 of the Clayton Act provided:
that the labor of a human being is not a commodity or
article of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and
operation of labor, agricultural and horticultural organizations instituted for the purpose of mutual help
and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or
to forbid or restrain individual members from such
organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objectives thereof, be held or construed to be
illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade
under the anti-trust laws.15
Furthermore, section 20 bars the issuance of injunctions by Federal courts "in any case between an employer and employees
[involving] ... a dispute concerning terms or conditions of

employment" and concludes with the broad language, "[n]or
shall any of the acts specified in this paragraph be considered
or held to be violations of any law of the United States."'16
Although the legislative history of the Clayton Act was obscure,1 7 an apparent attempt was made to narrow the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Indeed, the Act was hailed by8 labor
leader, Samuel Gompers, as the laborer's "Magna Carta."
14. McCulloch, New Problems in the Administration of the Labor-Manage-

mnent Relations Act: The Taft-Hartley Injunction, 16 Sw. L.J. 82, 88 (1962).
15. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1963).
16. 38 Stat. 738 (1914), as amended 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1965).
17. See Frankfurter & Greene, supra note 5, at 141-45.

18. 21 American Federationist 971.
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The federal courts, however, gave a restrictive interpretation
of the terms of the Act. In Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v.
Mitchel't9 the Supreme Court allowed an injunction against a
union seeking recognition on the ground of unlawful purpose
without even discussing the Clayton Act sections. The Clayton
Act's attempted labor exemption was most totally rendered
20
impotent in the case of DupZem PrWintng Pr'ess Co. w. Deeirng.
The Court held that section 6 did not confer immunity, "where
2
[unions] depart from .. . normal and legitimate objects." '
...
Nor did section 20 bar an injunction since it was restricted to
"a case between an employer and employees" 2 2 and secondary

activity was involved here.
Thus, it became apparent that the objectives test survived the
Clayton Act. In the second Coronado Coal Co. v. UMfW 23 case,
Mr. Chief Justice Taft stated:
The mere reduction in the supply of an article to be
shipped in interstate commerce by the illegal or tortious
prevention of its manufacture or production is ordinarily an indirect and remote obstruction to that commerce. But when the intent of those unlawfully preventing the manufacture or production is shown to be to
restrain or control the supply entering and moving

interstate commerce, or the price of it in interstate
markets, their action is a direct violation of the Anti24
Trust Act.
Federal courts still decided according to their views of social
and economic policy the question of whether the employees'
demands justified their combining to inflict injury on an employer. Following the Clayton Act, injunctions were issued by
federal courts in ten of the next thirteen cases in which they
were requested.2 5 During the period from 1920 to 1930, the number of injunctions granted by state and federal courts actually
increased to 921.26 The first legislative attempt to curtail the
use of the injunction in labor disputes became little more than
a re-enactment of the Sherman Act. In fact, in one way, the
position of labor was distinctly worse. Under the Clayton Act, a
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

245 U.S. 229 (1917).
254 U.S. 443 (1921).
Id. at 469.
Id. at 470.
268 U.S. 295 (1925).
Id. at 310.

25. McCulloch, mtpra note 13, at 89.

26. WrrrE, msra note 4, at 84.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

5

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 5 [2020], Art. 2
SoUTH CARo0NA LAW REVIMw

(Vol. 292

private party could obtain injunctions, 27 whereas prior to the
Act, the federal government alone could obtain injunctions
2
against unlawful restraint of trade.

Results such as these led to a continued clamor for reform.
The 1928 Republican National Convention adopted a plank as
follows:
[The party favors freedom in wage contracts, the
right of collective bargaining by free and responsible
agents of their own choosing which develops and maintains that peaceful cooperation which gains its first
incentive through voluntary agreement.
We believe that injunctions in labor disputes have in
some instances been abused and have given rise to a
serious question for legislation.2 9
The Democratic National Convention spoke as follows:
We recognize that legislative and other investigations
have shown the existence of grave abuse in the issuance
of injunctions in labor disputes. No injunctions should
be granted in labor disputes except upon proof of
threatened irreparable injury and after notice and hearing and the injunction should be confined to those acts
which do directly threaten irreparable injury.30
Added to the clamor was the theory developed during the
Depression that, if workers were allowed to bargain collectively
with their employers, they could improve their wages and working conditions, resulting in general economic improvement for
the whole country.8 1
The efforts culminated in 1932 with the Norris-La Guardia
Act. The Act passed by large majorities in both Houses of Congress 3 2 commanded strong support in both parties, and was
signed by President Hoover.
B. The Norris-La Gmrdia Act
The Norris-La Guardia Act brought three interrelated policies
to bear in labor disputes. 33 First, it rejected the injunction as a
27. See 38 Stat. 737 (1914), as amended 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1963).
28. See 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1963).
29. 75 CONG. RF. 4502 (1932).

30. Id.
31. Cox,

LAW AND TEE NATIONAL LABOR PoLIcy

4-7 (1960).

32. The vote was 75 to 5 in the Senate and 362 to 14 in the House. BamNsTEI, THE LEAN YEARs 413 (1960).
33. Note, Labor Injunctions and Judge-Made Labor Law, 70 YALE L.. 70,

73 (1960).
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remedy. Second, the Act declared that federal courts were not
84
the proper institution to formulate substantive labor policy.
Third, it assured,
that the government shall occupy a neutral position,
lending its extraordinary power neither to those who
would have labor unorganized nor to those who would
5
organize it.3
The Act reflected a laissez-faire philosophy-that the settlement
of labor disputes is best accomplished privately at the primary
level of economic competition.8"
The device chosen by Congress to accomplish these goals was
the regulation of the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts
under its power in Article III of the Constitution. Section 1
removes from the federal courts "jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a case
involving or growing out of a labor dispute"" unless the strict
requirements of sections 7 and 8 are met.a8 Section 13 broadly
defines a "labor dispute" to include "any controversy concerning
terms or conditions of employment ... regardless of whether
or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee."3 9 In addition to these general statements,
section 4 explicitly immunizes nine separate activities, including
strikes and work-stoppages, picketing, and payment of strike
benefits.
Section 2, which in many respects foreshadowed the National
Labor Relations Act, in order to avoid the pitfall that killed the
Clayton Act, declares the policy of the United States in relation
34. See Marine Cooks v. Panama S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365, 370 n.7 (1960).
(Norris-La Guardia "was prompted by a desire ... to withdraw federal
courts from a type of controversy for which many believed they were ill-suited
and from participation in which, it was feared, judicial prestige must suffer.")
35. 75 CONG. REc. 4915 (1932) (remarks of Senator Wagner).
36. See S. RFP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1932); H. REP. No. 669,
72d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1932).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1965).
38. Section 7 requires a hearing in open court, substantial and irreparable
injury, greater injury by deniaf than granting, no adequate remedy at law, and
inability or unwillingness of public officers to protect property. Section 8 also
provides that "every reasonable effort' must be made to settle the dispute
before injunctive relief may be granted.
39. 29 U.S.C. § 113 (1965). The House Report described the broad provisions of section 13 as necessary "in order that the limitation may not be whittled away by refined definitions of what persons are to be regarded as legitimately involved in labor disputes ....." H. REP. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess.
11 (1932).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

7

South SouTH
CarolinaCAIONA
Law Review,
Vol. 22,
Iss. 5 [2020], Art.
2
LAw
REv[mw
[Vol.
2

to labor disputes.4 0 Section 3 declares the hated yellow-dog contract to be contrary to public policy and unenforceable in any
federal court.4 1 Section 5 deals with the question of conspiracy
42
of the enumerated acts.

The purpose of section 6 was to state the principles on which
the relationship between principal and agent was to be determined in labor cases. 43 Since, previously, employer relief was
often in the form of blanket injunctions against all sorts of
40. 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1965), declared that "[t]he individual unorganized
worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor." It also affirmed his right to "full freedom of
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own
choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment and...
[to] be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor
...
in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection...."
41. For an example of a yellow-dog contract cited by Senator Norris, see 75
CONG. REc. 4626 (1932). Such contracts had been approved by the Supreme
Court in Hitchinan Coal and Coke v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917). There
was some doubt as to the constitutionality of the provision under the "right of
contract." See 75 CONG. Rac. 4679 (1932). The constitutionality of Section 3
was upheld in the case of Laub v. Skinner, 303 U.S. 335 (1937).
42. 29 U.S.C. § 105 (1965) provides: "No court of the United States shall
have jurisdiction to issue an... injunction upon the ground that any of the
persons participating or interested in a labor dispute constitute or are engaged
in an unlawful combination or conspiracy because of the doing in concert of
the acts enumerated in Section 104 of this title." "This section is included
principally because many of the objectionable injunctions have been issued
under the provisions of the anti-trust laws, a necessary prerequisite for invoking the jurisdiction of which is a finding of the existence of a conspiracy or
combination and without which no injunction could have been issued." H. REP.

No. 669, 72d Cong., Ist Sess. 8 (1932).

43. Under the law of conspiracy as developed in labor cases, unions "were
held responsible not for acts of agents who had authority to act, but for every
act committed by any member of a union merely because he was a member, or
because he had some relation to the union although not authorized by virtue of
his position to act for the union in what he did." United Bhd. of Carpenters
and Joiners v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 419 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
Thus, section 6 "remedies a grossly unfair practice that has grown up of holding officers and members of unions liable for damages for the acts of other
members without proof of participation or direction or ratification of such
acts." 75 CONG. Rzc. 5463 (1932) (remarks of Rep. O'Connor). 29 U.S.C.
§ 106 (1965) provides:
No officer or member of any association or organization, and no
association or organization participating or interested in a labor
dispute, shall be held responsible or liable in any [federal] court
... for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members, or
agents, except upon clear proof of actual participation in, or actual
authorization of, such acts, or of ratification of such acts after
actual knowledge thereof.
This section was particularly necessary, since, under the reasoning of the
Debs case, an injunction might be issued to break a strike merely because of
unlawful acts which the union had not authorized and for which it would not
be responsible under the normal rules of agency. A. Cox & D. Box, LABOR
LAW 99 (6th ed., 1965).
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activities,44 section 9 allowed injunctions to prohibit only such
specific acts as had been expressly complained of and expressly
included in the findings of fact. Section 10 grants to either party
the right to appeal from an order granting or denying a temporary labor injunction, and the appeal is to be heard "with the
greatest possible expedition, giving the proceeding procedence
over all other matters except older matters of the same character."45 Finally, section 11 grants a jury trial in contempt cases.
It should be noted that the Act makes no distinction between
doing the acts in question with a legal object in view and doing
them with an illegal object, thus abrogating the "objectives
test."46 Judicial inquiry is limited to the narrow question of
whether a "labor dispute" exists.47 It should also be noted that
the Act did not make the conduct listed lawful for all purposes,
but rendered it only nonenjoinable. 48 Perhaps the significance of
Norris-La Guardia is not what it does for organized labor but
what it permits organized labor to do for itself without judicial
interference. 49
44. See, e.g., Reed Co. v. Whiteman, 238 N.Y. 545, 144 N.E. 885 (1924).
"[D]efendants ... are perpetually and permanently enjoined ... from hampering, hindering or harassing in any other way the free dispatch of business
by the plaintiff, and from using any and all ways, means and methods of doing
any of the aforesaid forbidden acts, either directly or indirectly, or through
their agents, officers or others." 238 N.Y. at 546. US. v. Taliaferro, 290 F.
214 (W.D.Va. 1922), affd, 290 F. 906 (4th Cir. 1923), shows the sweeping
effect of an injunction which has unnamed defendants. After a dragnet injunction, a barber unconnected with the strike displayed a sign in his window
saying, "No scabs wanted in here." He was found guilty of contempt of an
injunction against "abusing, intimidating, molesting, or annoying."
45. 29 U.S.C. § 110 (1965).
46. See Wilson & Co. v. Bin, 27 F. Supp. 915 (E. D. Pa), aff'd, 105 F. 2d
948 (3d Cir. 1939). "In short, [Norris-La Guardia] was an adoption of the
philosophy of Justice Brandeis's dissenting opinion in Duplex . . . which condemned the point of view which made conduct actionable 'when done for a
purpose which a judge considered socially or economically harmful and therefore branded as malicious and unlawful."' 27 F. Supp. at 917.
47. See, e.g., Marine Cooks v. Panama S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365 (1960).
48. See Gregory, supra note 3, at 187, 190. But see United State v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941) : "But to argue, as it was urged before us, that the
Duplex case still governs for purposes of a criminal prosecution is to say that
that which on the equity side of the court is allowable conduct may in a criminal proceeding become the road to prison. It would be strange indeed that
although neither the Government nor Anheuser-Busch could have sought an
injunction against the acts here challenged, the elaborate efforts to permit such
conduct failed to prevent criminal liability ....

"

Id. at 234-35.

49. See Gregory, supra note 3, at 186, 197. Norris-La Guardia "belongs to
that time bracket in which unions were expected to, and did, depend on their
own economic resources to put their programs across. Thus the act is the last
monument to the spirit of complete free enterprise for unions....
It did not
in any way commit the government to intervention on the side of the
unions.... Another way of looking at it is to suppose that Congress was
creating laissez faire, or economic free enterprise, for organized labor as well
as for big business." Id. at 192, 197.
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The Norris-La Guardia Act achieved its intended effect. Prior
to its enactment, there were at least 508 labor injunctions issued
by the federal courts.50 During the next eighteen years, only
sixty-six injunctions were issued.5 '
The notion that law had no positive role to play in labor relations was short-lived. The amended Railway Labor Act of 1934,
the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, and the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 subjected employers and unions
to legal rights and duties. Moreover, the enforcement of these
laws may require the use of injunctions in situations inconsistent
with Norris-La Guardia, and the federal judiciary may be encouraged again to assume policy-making functions. Therefore,
discussion of the contemporary labor injunction must begin with

a comparison of these different acts."2 Hopefully, such a comparison will shed some light on the present-day usefulness of the
policies inherent in Norris-La Guardia.

II. TaE RAmwAY

LABoR

AT

A. The Statutony Backgroumd
In its original form, the Railway Labor Act was enacted in
1926, replacing the Transportation Act of 1920. That prior
statute placed its reliance upon completely voluntary settlement
and was not supported by any legal sanction. 3 Because of the
infirmities of the earlier legislation, the 1926 Act was passed.
The Act adhered to a policy of the amicable adjustment of labor
disputes, but buttressed that policy by creating certain definite
legal obligations. The Act "channeled, but did not eliminate the
operation of private forces in the determination of labor disputes,154 but the legislative history of Norris-La Guardia shows
50. WrrE, supra note 4, at 84.

51. S. Doc. No. 7, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
52. See generally Aaron, The Labor Injunction Reappraised, 10 U.C.-L.A.L.
Rnv. 292 (1963); Loeb, Accommodation of the Norris-La Guardia Act to
Other Federal Statutes, 11 LAB. .JU.473 (1960); Comment, Jurisdiction of
Federal Courts to Enjoin Labor Disputes, 32 TENr. L. Rxv. 264 (1965);
Comment, Labor Injunctions and Judge-Made Labor Law, 70 YAim L.J. 70
(1960).
53. ee Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n no. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 542 (1936).
54. Rutland R.R. v. Locomotive Eng'rs, 307 F2d 21, 37 (1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 954 (1963). See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Toledo, P.&W.R.,
321 U.S. 50 (1944) : "The policy of the Railroad Labor Act was to encourage
use of the nonjudicial process of negotiation, mediation and arbitration for the
adjustment of labor disputes ....
The overall policy of the Norris-La
Guardia Act was the same." Id. at 58.
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that Congress gave little attention to the accommodation of the
two Acts. 55
In the original Act of 1926, a distinction was drawn between

disputes over the interpretation of existing collective bargaining
agreements and disputes over proposed changes in agreements.
The former, judicially50 labelled "minor" disputes, were to be
submitted to binding arbitration before boards agreed upon by
the parties; the latter, termed "major" disputes, were left to
supervised collective bargaining. This voluntary machinery
proved unsatisfactory, 57 and, in 1934, amendments were passed,
but again no indication was given of the extent to which the
anti-injunction statute would limit the remedial power of courts
in RLA cases.58
In both types of disputes, the Act requires that, as a first step,
the parties make every reasonable effort to settle their differences in conference. 59 Where private negotiation fails, the procedures for settling major and minor disputes diverge. In the
case of a minor dispute, either party may submit the matter to
the National Railroad Adjustment Board, and the Board's decision is final and binding on the parties. 60 Major disputes commence with the issuance of a notice known as a "Section 6
notice," given by the party seeking to change existing agree55. In response to a question of whether the anti-injunction bill would make
it possible for unions to tie up the railroads, representative La Guardia replied
that the RLA "takes care of the whole labor situation pertaining to railroads.
They could not possibly come under this for the reason that we provided the
machinery there for settling labor disputes." 75 CONG. Rrc. 5499 (1932). Later,
after referring to section 8, La Guardia stated: "So that there is the tie-up
between the provisions of the Railway Labor Act and the necessity of exhausting every remedy to adjust any difference which might arise, the workers
could not and would not think of going on strike before all the remedies provided in the law have been exhausted. If the railroads have complied, they
would not, as has been suggested, be deprived of any relief which they may
have in law or equity." Id. at 5504-05.
56. These terms were first used in Elgin J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S.
711, 722-28 (1945).
57. Deadlocks often resulted from the refusal by one side to participate in
the voluntary boards and in many cases in which boards were established no

decision could be reached because of the equal number of labor and management members on each board. See H. R_ REP. No. 1944, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess.
3 (1934).
58. Comment, Labor Injunctions and Judge-Made Labor Law, supra note 52,
at 76-77.
59. Railway Labor Act § 2 First, 45 U.S.C. § 152 First (1954) [hereinafter
cited as RLA].
60. RLA § 3 First (i)(1) (m) (n), 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i)(1) (m) (n)
(1954). See Union Pac. R.R. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601 (1959). See generally
Garrison, The National Railroad Adjustment Board: A Unique Administrative
Agency, 46 YALE L.J. 567 (1937).
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ments. 6 1 If settlement cannot be reached in conference, the matter is referred to mediation under the auspices of the National
Mediation Board. 2 If mediation fails, the Mediation Board proposes voluntary arbitration to the parties. 63 Finally, if the
President of the United States desires, he is empowered to set
up an emergency board to investigate and report to him with
respect to the dispute.6 4 The carrier may not alter rates of pay,
rules, or working conditions until the Mediation Board has acted
upon the dispute.6 5
A large backlog of undecided claims accumulated before several divisions of the National Railroad Adjustment Board
(NRAB), delaying decisions from a minimum of several months
to ten years or more. 66 To expedite disposition of minor disputes,
Congress, in 1966, passed amendments which gave parties to such
67
disputes the right to request special boards.
B. Mandatory Inwntions Commanding the Employer to
Bargain

The Railway Labor Act (RLA) was the first important entree
of the federal government into the field of labor relations in an
attempt to structure the relationship of the parties within a legal
framework.6 8 In this important interstate industry, Congress
concluded that legal as well as economic forces were needed to
adjust the respective interests of labor, management, and the
public.6 9 The RLA guarantees the right to organize70 and estab61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

RLA
RLA
RLA
RLA
RLA

§ 2 Seventh, 6, 45 U.S.C. § 152 Seventh, 156 (1954).
§ 5, 45 U.S.C. § 155 (1954).
§ 5, 7, 45 U.S.C. § 155, 157 (1954).
§ 10, 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1954).
§ 6, 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1954). For a concise statement of the major

dispute procedures of Mr. Justice Harlan, see Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen
v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 398 (1969).
66. See Walker v. Southern Ry., 385 U.S. 196, 198 (1966).
67. A union or carrier may request the establishment of a special board of
adjustment for the purpose of resolving disputes otherwise referable to the
NRA or disputes which have been pending before the NRAB for a year or
more. The award of such boards has the same effect as an NRAB award. 3
CCH LAn. L. REP. ff 5675, at 11,255. In addition, the 1966 amendments streamlined the judicial enforcement and review of awards handed down by the
NRAB or other adjustment boards. See 3 CCH LAB. L. REP. ff 6090, 551, at
11,497. Figures on the performance of the special boards of adjustment provided by the 1966 admendments are not available yet, but the Report of the
National Mediation Board for 1967 reveals no appreciable decline in NRAB
delay, nor any great use of this new device. See REPORT Or NMB (1968) at 44.
68. Two earlier attempts to regulate labor-management relations, the Erdman Act and See. 7 of the National Industrial Recovery Act, became subject
to constitutional difficulties in Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908),
and A.L.A. Scheehter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
69. Loeb, supra note 52, at 477.
70. RLA § 2 Fourth, 45 U.S.C. § 152 Fourth (1954).
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lishes an employer's duty to recognize and bargain with the
majority union.71 Prior to the enactment of Norris-La Guardia,
the power of federal courts to restrain violations by an employer
of rights guaranteed employees by the RLA had been upheld by
the Supreme Court.7 2 The question of whether this judicial
remedy survived Norris-LaGuardia was first presented in Virginian. Ry. v. .System Federaion No. 40,73 which arose after the
1934 amendments to the RLA had been adopted. There, the
Supreme Court held that Norris-La Guardia does not prohibit
issuance of a mandatory injunction commanding an employer to
bargain with a certified union. Discussing section 9 of NorrisLa Guardia, the Court stated the purpose of this section
was not to preclude mandatory injunctions, but to forbid blanket injunctions against labor unions, which are
usually prohibitory in form, and to confine the injunction to the particular acts complained of and found by
the court.74
Similar objections were dismissed as "strained and unnatural
75
constructions of the words of the Norris-La Guardia Act," in
conflict with its declared purpose as set forth in section 2.
Finally, the Court reasoned that, "such provisions [2, Ninth, of
the RLA] cannot be rendered nugatory by the earlier and more
general provisions of the Norris-La Guardia Act."76 Virginian
Ry. was the first case to reconcile the laissez-fairepolicy of Norris-La Guardia with a regulatory statute. The opinion has been
criticized on the ground that the crucial issue should have
involved a balancing of the importance of the particular provi77
sions to the major policies of the separate acts.

71. RLA § 2 Ninth, 45 U.S.C. § 152 Ninth (1954).
72. Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930)

(enjoining the carrier from interfering with employees in the selection of their
representative in violation of § 2, Third). The carrier had argued that the
injunction was barred by the Clayton Act. Although the Court did not pass
on the point, it stated: "It may be doubted whether Section 20 [of the Clayton
Act] can be regarded as limiting the authority of the court to restrain the
violation of an explicit provision of an Act of Congress, where an injunction
would otherwise be the proper remedy." 281 U.S. at 571.

73. 300 U.S. 515 (1937).

74. Id. at 563. However, the statute does not distinguish between mandatory
and prohibitory orders and applies to suits against employers as well as unions.
See Comment, Labor Injunctions and Judge-Made Law, supra note 52, at 78.
75. 300 U.S. at 563.
76. Id.
77. See Comment, Labor Injuixtions and Judge-Made Law, supra note 52,
at 79.
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(. Injunctions Against Ravial Discriminationby the Bargaining
Representative
The Supreme Court next considered enjoining violations of
protected rights under the RLA in the companion cases of Steele
v. Louisville and Nashville R. 0o.78 and Tunstall v. Brotherhood
of Locomotive Firemen.7 9 Although the Court did not consider
the impact of Norris-La Guardia, 0 it interpreted the RLA as
requiring the union certified as majority representative to represent equally all the members of its unit, and enjoined the execution of a collective bargaining agreement which discriminated
against the Negro members.
Five years later, in Graham 'v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
1 under analogous facts, the Court declared that the
Firemen,"
"Norris-La Guardia Act did not deprive federal courts of jurisdiction to compel compliance with positive mandates of the
Railway Labor Act.18 2 The Court stated:
Nor does the Norris-La Guardia Act contain anything to suggest that it would deprive these Negro firemen of recourse to equitable relief from illegal discriminatory representation by which there would be taken
from them their seniority and ultimately their jobs.
Conversely there is nothing to suggest that, in enacting
the subsequent Railway Labor Act provisions insuring
petitioners' right to nondiscriminatory representation
by their bargaining agent, Congress intended to hold
out to them an illusory right for which it was denying
them a remedy. If, in spite of the Virginian,Steele, and
Tunstall cases, supra, there remains any illusion that
under the Norris-La Guardia Act the federal courts axe
powerless to enforce these rights, we dispel it now. 88
More recently, the Supreme Court in Glover v. St. Louis-San
FranciscoRailway 0o.,8 4 held that the federal courts had juris78. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
79. 323 U.S. 207 (1944).
80. The Steele action was brought in a state court and the propriety of the
injunctive remedy was not passed on in Tunstall. See Chicago, R.I. & Pac.
RR. v. Switchmen's Union, 292 F2d 61, 64-65 (2d Cir. 1962).

81. 338 U.S. 232 (1949).
82. Id. at 237.

83. Id. at 239-40. For later cases applying the Steele doctrine, see Brother-

hood of R. R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 763 (1952), and Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). See generally Aaron, The Union's Duty of Fair
Representation,under the Railroad Labor and National Labor Relations Acts,
34 J. Am L. & Com. 167 (1968).
84. 393 U.S. 324 (1969). The Court held that the NRAB did not have
exclusive jurisdiction and that resort to contractual or administrative remedies
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diction where the dissident workers sought injunctive relief
against their union and employer and the complaint alleged a
contract violation as well as discrimination.
D. Injunctions in "Minor" Disputes
It should be noted that none of the foregoing injunctions involved an activity specifically immunized by section 4 of NorrisLaGuardia. The situation first arose in Brotherhood of R.R.
Traiwmen v. Chicago River and Ind. Ry., 5 where the Supreme
Court affirmed the issuance of an injunction against a strike, the
classic situation with which Norris-La Guardia was concerned.
The union had called a strike in an attempt to coerce settlement
of a "minor" dispute which the carrier had submitted to the
NRAB. The Court viewed the question as
whether the Federal courts can compel compliance with
the provisions of the Act to the extent of enjoining a
union from striking to defeat the jurisdiction of the
Adjustment Board. 6
The Court then answered:
We hold that the Norris-La Guardia Act cannot be
read alone in matters dealing with railway labor disputes. There must be an accommodation of that statute
and the Railway Labor Act so that the obvious purpose
think that the
in the enactment of each is preserved. We
87
purposes of these Acts are reconcilable.
The Court reasoned that the Norris-La Guardia Act was aimed
against the issuance of injunctions by federal courts in labor
disputes where "the injunction strips labor of its primary
weapon without substituting any reasonable alternative."88 It
found that the Adjustment Board provided a reasonable alternative to the limited concession of the right to strike.
The Court also distinguished several cases in which the NorrisLa Guardia Act's ban on federal injunctions was not lifted even
though the conduct of the union was unlawful under some other
would have been futile. But cf. Brady v. Trans-World Airlines, 401 F2d 87
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1048 (1969) [Since reinstatement and backpay were awarded by the court for company and union violation of Section 2
(Fourth) (Eleventh), no award should be made for the lack of fair representation where the employee had failed to exhaust his internal remedies] ; compare
Vaca v. Sikes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); see also Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25
(1970).
85. 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
86. Id. at 39.
87. Id. at 40.
88. Id. at 41.
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statute. These cases were inapposite, because "none involved the
need to accommodate two statutes, when both were adopted as
a part of a pattern of labor legislation. 3 9
Finally, the Court reiterated its earlier statements that the
specific provisions of the RLA take precedence over the more
general provisions of Norris-La Guardia.
The opinion has been criticized on the ground that the Court
should not ask whether Congress intended to replace economic
warfare with peaceful arbitration, but whether that policy is
sufficiently important in this instance to warrant use of an
otherwise undesirable remedy. 90
In Locomotive Engineers v. Louisville & N.R.R. 91 the union
threatened to strike after the NRAB made an award to enforce
the union's interpretation of the back pay award. 92 The Supreme
Court held that the statutory enforcement provisions are mandatory and exclusive and that an injunction must issue to bar a
strike to enforce a NRAB award. The Court rejected the union's
argument that the Chicago River principle is limited only to
those situations in which a strike is called during the proceedings before the NRAB and that, once a favorable award has been
rendered, the union is free to enforce it either by following the
judicial procedure or by resorting to economic force.
With respect to minor disputes, the RLA provides that grievances must first be handled in "the usual manner" up to and
including the chief operating officer of the carrier.93 Lower
federal courts promptly used the Chicago River principle to
enjoin strikes at any stage of the procedure, even before submission to the NRAB. However, in Aanionv . Kansas City Terminal
Railway,9 4 the Supreme Court indicated that injunctive relief
would not be available unless the carrier had referred the matter
89. Id. at 42. See also Order of 1LR. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry.,
362 U.S. 330, 339 (1960). This suggestion seems inconsistent with its decision
in Allen; Bradley Co. v.Local 3 Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797
(1945), upholding antimonopoly policy over anti-injunction policy, and also
makes the assumption that the objectives of labor statutes are more important
than those of non-labor statutes. See Meltzer, The Chicago and North Western
Case: Judicial Workmanship and Collective Bargaining, SUPREE COURT
REvIw 113, 154 (Kurland ed. 1960).
90. Comment, Labor Inunctions and Judge-Made Law, supra note 52, at 81.

91. 373 U.S. 33 (1963).

92. Formerly, the statutory provision making NRAB awards final and binding contained an exception for money awards. The 1966 amendments deleted
that exception and gave money awards the same status as non-money awards.
See note 67. Thus, the problem would probably not arise today.
93. 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i)(1954).

94. 353 U.S. 927 (1957).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol22/iss5/2

16

1970]

Wimberly: The Labor Injunction--Past, Present, and Future
THE LABoR IwNJUcTIOx

to the NRAB, although they granted leave to apply for reinstatement if the dispute were submitted to the NRAB within a
reasonable time.
It should be noted that, in Manion, the grievance procedures
had been completed and either party could have submitted the
dispute to the 1NRAB. At least two circuits have interpreted the
Manion rule to apply only to minor disputes which have been
fully processed short of the final appeal to the 1NRAB, and not
as a bar to injunctions against strikes over minor disputes which
have not been carried through the parties' own grievance procedure.9 5
This solution seems sensible in those situations where the carrier and the union are required to exhaust their own contractual
grievance machinery before resorting to the NRA.B, and the
union strikes before these steps are completed. Moreover, these
holdings seem reconcilable with section 8 of the Norris-La
Guardia Act. 96 Because the RLA was drafted without consideration of Norris-La Guardia's prohibitions, courts should not employ the all-or-nothing approach implicit in the labels, "repeal"
or "takes precedence," when attempting to harmonize the two
pieces of legislation. 97 Procedures such as Norris-La Guardia's
procedural safeguards, which do not hamper enforcement of the
RLA, should be retained in deference to the still vital policy
against injunctions. Thus, several circuits have indicated that,
even though they are not ousted of jurisdiction to grant injunctions, the "clean hands" provision of section 8 of Norris-La
Guardia still is applicable. 98 Under this theory a petitioner may
95. See Brotherhood of R.R. Carmen v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 354 F2d 786
(8th Cir. 1965); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. J.N. Brown, 252 F.2d 149

(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 949 (1958).

96. See Brotherhood of R.R. Carmen v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 354

F.2d 786 (8th Cir. 1965). In answering the argument that the injunctive
process of the court could not be invoked until a dispute was before the
NRAB, the court said: "In answer to the foregoing argument, it is clear that
in the instant case, at the time of the illegal and unauthorized strike, the carrier had made 'every reasonable effort' to settle the dispute involved, even
though the dispute had not yet gone before the Adjustment Board." Id. at 794.
97. Comment, Labor Injunctions and Judge-Made Law, supra note 52, at 79.
98. See Railway Clerks v. Railway Express Agency, 391 F.2d 657 (8th Cir.
1968); Railroad Trainmen v. Akron R.R., 385 F2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 923 (1968); cf. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Toledo, P.&W. R.R., 321 U.S. 50 (1944) (even though Section 7 satisfied,
Section 8 required submission of the dispute to arbitration before injunction
would issue). In Akron, the court stated: "It may be that in a particular case
the District Court might conclude that the imperatives of the Railway Labor

Act override Section 8-a statutory focusing so to speak of an equity approach
whereby lack of clean hands may be overcome by a balancing of interests, particularly where it is the public interest involved." It has been suggested that a
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have to exert "every reasonable effort" to settle a dispute before
seeking an injunction against a strike in a minor dispute.99
Because of the NRAB backlog of cases, it was possible for an
employer to submit the dispute to this crowded docket and make
extensive unilateral changes in the collective bargaining agreement shielded by the strike injunction from union reprisals. 100
To remedy this injustice, the Supreme Court, in Locomotive
Engineers v. Missouri-Kaas-Texa8R.R.,1° 1 said that although
a carrier may obtain an injunction against a strike over a minor
dispute under Chicago River, a district court, in the exercise of
its equitable discretion, may impose conditions upon the granting
of such injunctive relief. When the disposition of the grievance
would take considerable time and the union can show irreparable
harm as a result, the district court may condition the issuance of
injunctive relief upon the carrier's maintenance of the status quo
pending the Board's decision. This comparison of relative hardships may ultimately inject the judiciary into the same type of
policy-making that Norris-La Guardia sought to withdraw.10 2
However, in light of the 1966 Amendments expediting the
NRAB procedure and the availability of the Section 6 notice to
terminate the contract, L0 3 the need for such relief is not likely to
be frequent.
Missouri-Jfansas-Texas expressly reserved the question of
whether the union by independent suit could enjoin the carrier
to restore the status quo while the dispute was pending before
liberal application of this dictum could read Section 8 out of the RLA cases,
which by definition, always involve the "public interest." See 1969 ABA SECmoN ON LABOR RELATIONS LAW 131.
99. See Brotherhood of R.R. Carmen v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 354 F2d 786
(8th Cir. 1965) ; Rutland Ry. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 307 F.2d

21 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 954 (1963)

(carrier must "confer"

with union representatives).
100. In theory, the union is protected against unilateral changes by this

procedure, for if the NRAB decides that the contract did not allow manage-

ment to make the change, the union can receive retroactive relief for damages

suffered while the change was in force. Comment, Labor Injunctions and
Judge-Made Law, supra note 52, at 83. However, the excessive delay may
make this remedy ineffective. See Comment, Enjoining Strikes and Maintaining the Status Quo it Railway Labor Disputes, 60 CoLum. L. Rxv. 381, 393

(1960).
101. 363 U.S. 528 (1960).
102. Other criticisms of the decision are that it may discourage use of the
NRAB and deny management freedom to seek more efficient methods on good
faith interpretations of the collective bargaining agreement. Comment, Labor
Injunctions and Judge-Made Law, supra note 52, at 85. Moreover, the decision
merely shifts the loss since even if management ultimately prevails there is no
way for the union to compensate the carrier. See 76 HAxv. L. REv. 426 (1962).
103. See Part F. infra.
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the NIRAB. 10 4 At the present time, there is a split among the
lower federal courts,10 5 as to whether a union is entitled directly
to injunctive relief restraining the carrier from unilateral action
arguably in breach of contract. On the one hand, it is argued
that it is an anomaly to require a union to seek such interim
relief by the circuitous route of threatening a strike in order to
draw an injunction application by the carrier so that it might
then pray for conditions thereon.106 In contrast, it is argued
that, had Congress intended such a limitation, some kind of
status quo provisions would have been legislated for minor
disputes as it was for major ones. 10 7
It is submitted that the latter approach is correct. The cases
accommodating Norris-La Guardia and the RLA have granted
injunctions only to compel compliance with the positive mandates of the RLA. The Missouri-Kansas-Teoasdevice was not an
injunction in the usual sense, for the word "condition" seems to
indicate that retention of the status quo by the employer is
merely a prerequisite to injunctive relief.108 Moreover, the availability of the termination procedure10 9 should alleviate any
hardship. Professor Aaron points out that allowing independent
suit by the union would merely shift the hardship to the employer; the former can count on same retroactive relief if it was
a favorable NRAB award, but the latter, even though it should
win, will not be compensated for the delay.' 10
E. Injunctions in "Major" Disputes
In Elgin J.&E. Ry. 'v. Burley,"' the Court, in speaking of
major disputes, stated:
104. 363 U.S. at 531 n.3.
105. For cases holding that unions are entitled to such relief, see Westchester
Lodge 2186 v. Railway Express Agency, 329 F2d 748 (2nd Cir. 1964); Railroad Yardmasters of America v. St. Louis-San Francisco R.R., 231 F. Supp.
986 (N.D. Texas, 1964); contra, Hilbert v. Pennsylvania R.R-, 290 F.2d 881
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 900 (1961); Switchmen's Union v. Central

of Ga. Ry., 341 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1965).

106. Kroner, Interim Injunctive Relief Under the Railway Labor Act, 18
N.Y.U. CONF. LAB. 179, 182 (1965).
107. McGuinn, Injunctive Powers of the Federal Courts in Cases Involving
Disputes Under the Railway Labor Act, 50 GEo. L. J. 46, 76 (1961).
108. Comment, Labor Injunctions and Judge-Made Law, supra note 52, at 84.
See also Order of Ry. Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561 (1945), where such
independent relief was denied sub silentio and Detroit & Toledo Shore Line

P.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142 (1969), where the Court's rationale may agreeably be applicable to the minor dispute situation.
109. See Part F infra.
110. See 35 3. AiR L. & Com. 517 (1969).

111. 325 U.S. 711 (1945).
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The paruties are required to submit to the successive
procedures designed to induce agreement. Section 5
First (b). But compulsions go only to insure that those
procedures are exhausted before resort can be had to
1 12
self-help.
This statement seems to indicate that, under the Chicago River
doctrine, Norris-La Guardia will not bar the injunctions in
major disputes as long as the statutory procedures have not been
exhausted. However, some doubt has been cast on this conclusion
in later opinions. Citing its prior decision in Brotherhood of
R.R.Trainmen v. Toledo, P. f -W. R.R.,113 the Court in Chicago
River, in a dictum footnote, indicated that Norris-La Guardia
precludes issuance of an injunction in a major dispute case, since
the RLA does not provide a process for final decision as it does
in minor disputes. The Toledo case, however, is sharply limited
by its factual context.1 1 4 Later, in Order of R.R. Telegraphers
v. Chicago and N.W. Ry.,"l 5 the Court held that Norris-La
Guardia barred a pernanent injunction against a threatened
strike in a major dispute. The court distinguished previous cases
allowing injunctions on the ground that the unions had either
"stepped outside their legal duties and violated the Act which
called them into being," as in the discrimination cases, or had
struck "in plain violation of a basic command of the railway
'
as in Chicago River. Apparently, the union had
Labor Act""7
complied with the negotiation procedures."
In Detroit and ToZedo Shore Line R.R.," l8 the Supreme Court
cleared up the confusion by clearly holding that an injunction is
available to prevent one of the parties from resorting to selfhelp while the Act's major dispute procedures are being followed. It is also firmly established that, once the procedures for
the settlement of major disputes are exhausted, the Act allows
the parties to resort to self-help; therefore, the proscripions of
112. Id. at 725.
113. 321 U.S. 50 (1944).
114. In Toledo, the union had exhausted all the steps required by the RLA.

The Court held that
mandatory procedures
La Guardia, and that
meant that it had not

the carrier's attempt to obtain an injunction after all
had been met by the union was prohibited by Norristhe carrier's failure to submit to voluntary arbitration
used "every reasonable effort to settle" the dispute. 321

U.S. at 65.
115. 362 U.S. 330 (1960).
116. Id. at 338.

117. "[N]either the respondent nor anyone else points to any other specific
legal command that the union violated here ... ." Id. at 339. Thus, the case
can be explained on the ground that it involved no violation of the RLA.
118. 396 U.S. 142 (1969).
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Norris-La Guardia prevent the issuance of an injunction to
prevent such resort.11 9
The Detroit case concisely stated the major dispute settlement
provisions:
There are three status quo provisions in the Act, each
covering a different stage of the major dispute settlement procedures. Section 6 . . .provides that "rates of

pay, rules, or working conditions shall not be altered"
during the period from the first notice of a proposed
change in agreements up to and through any proceedings before the National Mediation Board. Section 5
First provides that for 30 days following the closing of
Mediation Board proceedings "no change shall be made
in the rates of pay, rules, or working conditions or
established practices in effect prior to the time the dispute arose," unless the parties agree to arbitration or a
Presidential Emergency Board is created during the 30
days. Finally Section 10 provides that after the creation
of an Emergency Board and for 30 days after the
Board has made its report to the President, "no change,
except by agreement, shall be made by the parties to the
controversy in the conditions out of which the dispute
arose." These provisions must be read in conjunction
with the implicit status quo requirement in the obligation imposed upon both parties by Section 2 First, "to
exert every reasonable effort" to settle disputes without
120
interruption to interstate commerce.
These provisions are generally called the "status quo" provisions, and the federal courts have freely enjoined carriers from
changing the status quo while the settlement procedures are still
active. There had been some question as to whether the status
quo "freeze" applied to the total working conditions or only
those working conditions embodied in the existing contract. The
Detroit case answered this question as follows:
The obligation of both parties during a period in
which any of those status quo provisions is properly
invoked is to preserve and maintain unchanged those
actual, objective working conditions and practices,
broadly conceived, which were in effect prior to the
119. See Brotherhood of RLR. Trainmen v. Jacksonviffe Terminal Co., 394

U.S. 369 (1969).
120. 396 U.S. at 150-51.
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time the pending dispute arose and which are involved
in or related to that dispute... and clearly these condi121
tions need not be covered in an existing agreement.

Under this test the court apparently must examine the section 6
notice to determine whether the carrier's action is on a subject
being bargained on pursuant to the notice or whether the particular change is not covered by the notice.
The Fifth Circuit has held that a federal court may award
back pay and reinstatement as part of an order enforcing the
status quo in a major dispute, and that such a suit may be
122
brought by individual employees as well as by the union.
The federal courts have consistently refused to grant injunctions designed to extend any of the "cooling-off" periods beyond
the specific limits fixed by statute. 23 In similar fashion, to
avoid indefinite postponement of the use of self-help, courts have
refused to allow the parties to invoke the negotiation procedures
a second time, 124 unless perhaps where the second section 6 notice
is unrelated to the first dispute and the strike is obviously over
the second dispute.125 However, the Seventh Circuit has recently
ruled that the Norris-La Guardia Act does not prohibit a district
court from granting an injunction to maintain the status quo
pending appeal, even though the court determines that Norris-La
12 6
Guardia prohibits an injunction below.
Many of the above principles were involved in Brotherhood
of Ry. &f Steamship OZerks v. FZorida East Coast Ry. 127 There,
employees of the railway went on strike after the major disputes
provisions had failed to settle a wage dispute. The railway resumed partial operations soon thereafter by employing a substantially different labor force and negotiated individual agreements with the replacements making changes in working
121. 396 U.S. at 152-53 (emphasis added).
122. See Mungin v. Florida East Coast Ry., 416 F.2d 1169 (5th Cir. 1969);
United Industrial Workers v. Board of Trustees of Galveston Wharves, 400
F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1968).
123. See, e.g., Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Baltimore & O.R.R.,
372 U.S. 284 (1963).
124. See Pan American World Airways v. Flight Eng'rs, 306 F.2d 840 (2d
Cir. 1962).
125. See Pullman Co. v. Order of Ry. Conductors, 316 F.2d 556 (7th Cir.
1963); Florida East Coast Ry. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 336 F.2d
172 (5th Cir, 1964).
126. Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. United Transportation Union, 422 F.2d 979
(7th Cir. 1970); but see Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific MR. v. Switchmea's
Union, 292 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1961).

127. 384 U.S. 238 (1966).
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conditions unrelated to the original dispute. The union argued
that these changes must also go through the statutory bargaining
procedures before self-help could be taken.
The Court stated that normally self-help is available to the
carrier after the statutory procedures are exhausted, but recognized the Union's position that these changes were not raised
during the statutory bargaining. However, under the circumstances, the Court held that a carrier may petition a district
court to make unilateral changes in other working conditions as
are "reasonably necessary" for continued operation without further negotiation. Although the holding is necessary to avoid an
interruption in commerce and to make self-help equally available
to the carrier, the procedure may involve the courts in resolving
union-management disputes over working conditions.
Of course, the mere fact that major dispute statutory bargaining procedures are pending may not automatically mean that
any self-help measure during that period is enjoinable. If a
strike is in protest to matters in no way related to the pending
negotiations, there is authority to the effect that no mandatory
provisions of the R'LA are being violated and therefore the con128
duct is nonenjoinable.
Although the RLA does not require that agreement be reached
during the statutory bargaining procedures,
"it does command those preliminary steps without
which no agreement can be reached. It at least requires
the employer to meet and confer with the authorized
representative of its employees, to listen to their complaints, to make reasonable effort to compose differences--in short, to enter into a negotiation for the
settlement of labor disputes as is contemplated by § 2,

First.5)129

That section of the RLA requires the parties "to exert every
reasonable effort" to settle disputes. "This duty is not merely
perfunctory. Good faith exhaustion of the possibility of agreetion against a strike if the union is in violation of this mandate
even though the statutory periods are exhausted? The Seventh
Circuit has held that § 2, First does not contemplate judicial
enforcement of its "reasonable effort" requirement, but is merely
128. See Eastern Air Lines v. Flight Eng'rs Int'l Ass'n, 340 F.2d 104 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
129. Virginia Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 548 (1937).
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ment is required to fulfill

it.

'a

130

Can a carrier obtain an injunc-

a statement of the policy of the status quo provisions, 31 but the
Second and Fourth Circuits have implied that such an injunction would be proper.8 2 Most of the precedents on this point are
13
not helpful since they deal with outright refusals to bargain. 3
It is submitted that § 2, First at least imposes an obligation on
the parties to meet and to discuss the issues in question.134 Any
further obligations on the parties, however, would involve the
courts in just the kind of determinations that Norris-La Guardia
meant to avoid.
The National Mediation Board may have a function in
enforcing compliance with § 2, First. The NMB must notify both
parties that its mediatory efforts have been unsuccessful in order
for the second thirty day "cooling-off" period to begin running. 135 If the NMB is of the opinion that one of the parties is
not negotiating in good faith, it might simply retain jurisdiction thereby postponing the exercise of self-help. 13 The NMB
8 7
has much discretion in this regard.
Finally, § 2, First is also relevant as to whether a moving
party has complied with the "clean hands" provision of section 8
of Norris-La Guardia. A party who has not used "reasonable
effort" to settle a dispute may not be able to enjoin another
party's noncompliance with the statutory bargaining proced138
ures.
F. Problms of Classification
Several problems of classification exist as to whether injunctive relief is available under the RLA. First of all, the difference
between a "major" and a "minor" dispute is crucially important
because it may be determinative as to the availability of injunc130. Elgin, J.&E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 721 n.12 (1945).

131. See Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 422 F2d 979 (7th
Cir. 1970).
132. See Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. v. Switchmen's Union, 292 F2d
61 (1961); Piedmont Aviation v. ALPA, 416 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1969).
133. See, e.g., Virginian Ry. v. System Fedn No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
134. Cf. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 384
U.S. 238, 245 (1965); Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry.,
362 U.S. 330, 333-34 (1959) ; see geterally Harper, Major Disputes Under the
Railway Labor Act, 35 J. Am LAwi & Com. 3, 34-39 (1969).
135. 44 Stat. 580, as amended 48 Stat 1195, 45 U.S.C. § 155 (1964).
136. See Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 422 F2d 979 (7th
Cir. 1970) (dictum).
137. See International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. NMB,
425 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (NMB not easily amendable to mandamus);
see generally 35 3. Am. L. & Comx. 509-12 (1969).
138. See notes 98 and 99 supra, and the accompanying text.
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tive relief. Mr. Justice Rutledge, in his oft-quoted opinion in
Elgin J. & E. Ry. 'v. BuTkey, 13 9 explained the distinction:
The first [major dispute] relates to disputes over the
formation of collective agreements or efforts to secure
them. They arise where there is no such agreement or
where it is sought to change the terms of one, and
therefore the issue is not whether an existing agree-

ment controls the controversy. They look to the acquisition of rights claimed to have vested in the past.
The sceond class [minor disputes], however, contemplates the existence of a collective agreement already
concluded or, at any rate, a situation in which no effort
is made to bring about a formal change in terms or to
create a new one. The dispute relates either to the
meaning or proper application of a particular provision with reference to a specific situation or to an
omitted case. In the latter event the claim is founded
upon some incident of the employment relation, or
asserted one, independent of those covered by the collective agreement, e.g., claims on account of personal
injuries. In either case the claim is to rights accrued,
140
not merely to have new ones created for the future.
Therefore, the crucial question is whether the dispute concerns
the application of an existing agreement or the formation or
alteration of collective agreements. Virtually all subsequent
decisions have relied on this distinction in reaching a conclusion
of whether the dispute is major or minor. This question is crucial because, if the dispute is minor, then the injunctive remedy
is available against a strike under the Chicago River doctrine;
but, if the dispute is major, then self-help is available at the
conclusion of the statutory bargaining procedures.
The controversy generally arises when the carrier institutes a
unilateral change which the union objects to. Although many
decisions hold that the tactics of the parties are not controlling
because the substance of the dispute controls rather that the
parties' characterizations, 141 it will be seen that the determination of the dispute is largely going to depend on the action of
the parties. There seem to be several options open to the union.
139. 325 U.S. 711 (1945).
140. Id. at 723.
141. See, e.g., United Indus. Workers v. Board of Trustees of Galveston
Wharves, 351 F2d 183; 188-89 (5th Cir. 1965); Rutland Ry. v. Brotherhood
of Locomotive Eng'rs, 307 F2d 21, 33 (2d Cir. 1962).
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It can submit the dispute to the NRAB if it feels the change
violates the existing contract, or it can contend that the action
is an alteration of the contract without the proper procedures
having been followed by the carrier. The union could also file
a section 6 notice to modify the agreement to prevent such action
in the future, or it could file a section 6 notice while at the same
time submitting the issue to the _NRAB as a violation of the
existing agreement. Each of these possibilities will be discussed
in turn.
If the union contends the change violates the existing contract
and submits the dispute to the NRAB, the issue will not be
raised as the carrier will be perfectly satisfied in having the
controversy treated as a minor dispute. The union will not be
able to strike in support of its position, but the carrier will probably be able to institute its interpretation unilaterally subject to
the later determination of the NRAB, which may take a great
deal of time. Of course, if the union strikes anyway, an injunction may be conditioned upon maintenance of the status quo, and
several cases have allowed unions to independently obtain such
relief. 142
Suppose that the union contends that the change is an alteration of the contract and that the bargaining procedures must be
exhausted before the carrier can unilaterally take such action.
In this situation, most of the courts assert a theory of primary
jurisdiction that they must await the NRABs jurisdictional
determination of whether the dispute is major or minor.143 The
courts seem to be limiting themselves to a preliminary determination as to whether the agreement either arguably allows or
arguably prohibits the disputed subject. 44 As stated in a recent
case,
we think that, where the railroad asserts a defense based
on the terms of the existing collective bargaining
agreement, the controversy may not be termed a "major"
dispute unless the claimed defense is so obviously insubstantial as to warrant the inference that it is raised with
142. See Part D supra.

143. See, e.g., Itasca Lodge v. Railway Express Agency, 391 F2d 657 (8th
Cir. 1968); Piedmont Aviation v. ALPA, 416 F2d 633 (4th Cir. 1969); see
generally Harper, srupra note 134, at 12-27.
144. See, e.g., Switchmen's Union v. Southern Pac. Co., 398 F.2d 443 (9th
Cir. 1968); United Industrial Workers v. Board of Trustees of Galveston
Wharves, 351 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1965).
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by § 6
intent to circumvent the procedures 1prescribed
45
for alteration of existing agreements.

The few times that courts are likely to decide the major-minor
question on the merits at the time of an application for an
injunction occur when the impact of the change is very great. 140
In these circumstances the union may be able to enjoin the
changes pending the exhaustion of the major dispute bargaining
procedures. 47 But as a practical matter, the union's contention
is more likely to be treated as a minor dispute. This is probably
the correct result, since it is extremely difficult for courts to
decide that a change is covered by the agreement without deciding the merits of the controversy, and the NRAB is the expert
agency established for that very purpose. It is also analogous to
the presumption of arbitrability enunciated by the Supreme
Court in cases arising under the National Labor Relations
Act.' 48 But the union may not be very satisfied with the long
delays in obtaining NRAB rulings, especially when the carrier
may be able unilaterally to impose its interpretation.
Perhaps a better approach would be for the union to acquiesce
in the carrier's contention that its action is in accordance with
the existing bargaining agreement, thereby depriving the NRAB
of jurisdiction since there would be no dispute as to interpretation of the existing agreement. Then the union could serve a
section 6 notice of its desire to change the agreement, thus
transforming the dispute from minor to major and preserving
its right to strike after exhaustion of the major dispute settlement procedure.
There has been much confusion on the effect of a section 6
notice on the classification of major-minor disputes. Perhaps
much of the confusion arises because, in the railroad industry,
collective bargaining agreements generally do not have fixed
expiration dates. They are referred to as "open-end" contracts
and continue in effect until changed. 149
145. Southern Ry. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 384

F.2d 323, 327 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
146. Cf. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330, 341 (1960);
but see Itasca Lodge v. Railway Express Agency, 391 F.2d 657, 668 (8th Cir.
1968) (size or magnitude of dispute not ordinarily factor in classifying as
major or minor) ; Hilbert v. Pennsylvania R.R., 290 F.2d 881 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 900 (1961).
147. Cf. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 384 U.S.

238 (1966).
148. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 362
U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960).

149. See Railway Clerks v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R., 50 C.C.H.
RE'. 19, 299 (N.D. Ill., 1964).

LAB. L,
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Several commentators have asserted that the issuance of a section 6 notice should not determine the classification of a dispute, 150 and there is language in two courts of appeal cases in
accord. 15r However, the two cases may be explained on the
ground that they involved disputes unrelated to the section 6
notices. It has also been observed that, in prior cases held to
involve minor disputes, no effective section 6 notice was
served. 15 2
It is submitted that a section 6 notice as to the issue in question makes a dispute major, at least as to "open end" agreements.
One court has articulated this result as follows:
"It may be assumed, but without deciding, that both
parties might have agreed to submit to the Adjustment
Board the simple question as to the meaning, or proper
interpretation [of the agreement]. . . But the union
had the right, if it chose, to seek an addition of new
provisions. ...

The Railway Labor Act contemplates

such changes in or additions to agreements."' 5 "
The recent Detroit Supreme Court case seems to also recognize
this result.15 4
But what about the situation where the collective bargaining
agreement does have a fixed expiration date, and the union
serves a section 6 notice before the contract term would have
expired? Are the labor agreements in the railroad industry by
statute not written for a fixed term? 155 The cases passing on
these issues have granted injunctions against strikes in support
of these section 6 notices, either on the theory that the disputes
remain minor 5 6 or that the strike was in violation of the
150. See Kromer, supra note 106, at 188; McGuinn, supra note 107, at 62.
151. Rutland R.R. v. Locomotive Engineers, 307 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 954 (1963) ; Hilbert v. Pennsylvania R.R., 290 F.2d 881
(7th Cir.) cert. denied, 368 U.S. 900 (1961).

152. See Rutland R.R. v. Locomotive Engineers, 307 F2d 21, 42 (2d Cir.

1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 954 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
153. Order of Ry. Conductors & Brakemen v. Spokane, Portland, & Seattle
Ry., 366 F.2d 99, 104 (9th Cir. 1966).
154. See Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R., 396 U.S. 142, 145 (1969) ; see
also Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960).
In this connection, it is interesting to note the Seventh Circuit's subsequent
opinion in Illinois Central R.R. v. Locomotive Firemen, 332 F.2d 850 (7th

Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 932 (1964), where the court implied that a section
6 notice could convert the minor dispute into a major dispute.
155. See 35 J. AIR L. & Com. 509 (1969).

156. See Flight Eng'rs' Int'l Ass'n v. American Airlines, 303 F.2d 5 (5th
Cir. 1962); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 69 L.R.R.M.
2616 (N.D. Ill. 1968); cf Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Akron & Barberton Belt R.R., 385 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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RLA. 1 7 If fixed term agreements are valid under the RLA,
then the rationale of the Boys Markets'158 case would seem
applicable here.
The union's final option would be to contend that the carrier's
action is in violation of the existing contract and to also file a
section 6 notice to clear up the matter in the future. Under these
tactics the union might be able to preserve its right to strike
after the exhaustion of the settlement procedures and at the same
time seek injunctive relief against change of the "objective working conditions" under Detroit pending that exhaustion. And
there is always the chance that a special adjustment board might
render a decision in the union's favor in the meantime.
Many of these issues arose in Southern Ry. v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen.'5" There the controversy was
pending before the NMB, and the carrier also submitted the controversy to the NRAB. The union sought an injunction against
the carrier's alteration of working conditions in contravention of
section 6. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
noted that two separate disputes were involved, a minor dispute,
of which the NRAB had jurisdiction for a violation of the
existing collective bargaining agreement, and a major dispute
before the NMB, arising under a section 6 notice. The court did
not pass on the minor dispute question but granted an injunction
pending the exhaustion of the settlement proceedings, unless the
NRAB made a determination as to the proper interpretation of
the existing agreement in the meantime.
Could either of the parties while the major dispute settlement
procedures are in progress then withdraw their section 6 notice
and thereby terminate the major dispute? The courts are divided
on this question.' 60 This circumstance arose in the Detroit case,
but the Supreme Court did not pass on the issue.
A second question of classification concerns the scope of the
statutory duty to bargain. Major dispute procedures under section 6 are only required if the change concerns matters affecting
"rates of pay, rules, or working conditions." The question was
157. See Seaboard World Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 425 F.2d

1086 (2d Cir. 1970).

158. See Part IV infra.

159. 337 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1964).

160. See In the Matter of Hudson, 172 F. Supp. 329 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per

curiam sub. nor. Stickman v. General Grievance Comm. of the Bbd. of R.TR

Trainmen, 267 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960)
(notice effectively withdrawn); contra, Butte, A. & Pac. Ry. v. Brotherhood
of Locomotive Firemen, 268 F.2d 54 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 864

(1959).
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presented in Chicago & N. W. Ry. There, after the carrier instituted proceedings to abolish certain installations, the union
served a section 6 notice demanding negotiation. The carrier took
the position that the union's request was not within the scope of
section 6 and sought injunctive relief against a proposed strike.
The district court held that the proposed contract change was
within the scope of the duty to bargain over "rates of pay, rules,
and working conditions," but refused to grant a permanent injunction on the ground that this constituted a "labor dispute"
within section 13 of Norris-La Guardia. The Seventh Circuit
granted the injunction, holding that the matter was outside the
scope of mandatory bargaining and, therefore, concluding that
Norris-La Guardia was inapplicable. 16 1 The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the subject of the proposed contract
change was within the scope of the duty to bargain under the
RLA. 16 2 The opinion appears to define a broad scope for the
duty to bargain under the RLA.
Indeed, it has been persuasively argued that the RLA and the
National Labor Relations Act define the same area of collective
bargaining.10 3 The argument cites the fact that it was the Supreme Court's decision in Chicago & N. TV. Ry. that prompted
the National Labor Relations Board to abandon its view in
Fibreboard1104 when it decided Town and Oountry.1 6 5 In addition, the NLRB, in a footnote to its second Fibreboard'6 6 decision stated:
The substantial identity of the bargaining obligation
under the two acts is manifested in Elgin Railway v.
Railroad Trainmen, 302 F.2d 540 (CA7), where the
court held that pensions were a bargainable matter
under the Railway Labor Act citing the Inland Steel
decision where a similar holding had been made under
167
the National Labor Relations Act.

161. 264 F.2d 254, 260 (7th Cir. 1959).

162. 362 U.S. 330 (1960).

163. See Kroner, supra note 106, at 184-86. Section 8(d) of the NLRA
speaks of "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment" as
the scope of the duty to bargain.
164. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 130 NLRB 1558 (1961).
165. Town and Country Mfg. Co., 136 NLRB 1022, (1962), enf'd on other
grounds, 316 F2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963).
166. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 138 NLRB 550 (1962), enf'd, 332
F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
167. 138 NLRB at 553. See generally Harper, supra note 134 at 29-34; see
also Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S.
369 (1969) (where the Supreme Court discusses in great detail the applicability of NLRA precedents to the RLA).
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A third question of classification and perhaps the most difficult arises concerning activity such as strikes over unfavorable
government regulation and strikes against secondary employees.
An RLA union may become involved in a secondary boycott by
picketing a secondary employer or responding to picketing by
another union. Although the Supreme Court has not ruled
directly on the issue, 168 a majority of the Federal courts, relying
upon the broad definition of "labor dispute," have held that the
Norris-La Guardia Act applies to secondary boycotts. 16 9 Since
NRLA section 8 (b) (4) (B) is inapplicable to RLA employees, 170
the question arises as to how secondary boycotts should be
treated under the RLA.
Secondary boycotts do not seem to be major disputes, because
the parties to the boycott are the secondary employer and either
his employees or the primary employees, who do not want to
form a collective bargaining agreement. Likewise, the secondary
boycott does not arise directly out of the application of an
existing agreement so the dispute does not appear to be minor.
Nevertheless, some courts have attempted to classify secondary
boycotts as major or minor disputes. One approach is to focus
on the secondary dispute, 171 while another is to incorporate the
secondary dispute into the primary dispute. 172 Neither of these
approaches is satisfactory, however, because there is still no dispute between the secondary employer and his employees or the
168. But cf. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co.,

394 U.S. 369 (1969); Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama S.S. Co., 362

U.S. 365 (1960); Bakery Sales Drivers Union v. Wagshall, 333 U.S. 437, 442

(1948) (dictum).

169. See Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Dixie Motor Coach
Corp., 170 F.2d 902 (8th Cir. 1948); East Texas Motor Freight Lines v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 163 F.2d 10 (5th Cir. 1947) ; Lee Way Motor
Freight v. Keystone Freight Lines, 126 F2d 931 (10th Cir. 1942) ; contra,
Lakefront Dock & R.R. Terminal v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 333
F.2d 549 (6th Cir. 1964).
170. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394
U.S. 369, 376-77 (1968); Local 833, UAW, 116 NLRB 267, 274-75 (1956)

[railroad union not labor organization within 8(b)(4)(B)]. On the other
hand, where an RLA union responds to picketing by an NLRA union,
8(b) (4) (B) is applicable since the violation consists of inducing any "person."
Local 25, Teamsters v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 350 U.S. 155, 160-61
(1956) ; see also International Brotherhood of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 350
F.2d 791 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (which held that 8(b) (4) (B) was applicable where
the unions which represented only RLA employees were engaged in joint
venture with unions which were labor organizations.) See generally Comment,
Judicial Approaches to Secondary Boycotts Under the Railway Labor Act 42
N.Y.U.L. REv. 928 (1967).
171. See Local 143, Machinists v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 304 F.2d 206
(8th Cir. 1962).
172. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Local 523, Transport Workers, 190

F. Supp. 495 (W.D. Wash. 1961).
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primary employees which can be mediated or adjusted through
RLA procedures. 73
Even assuming, however, that secondary boycotts are neither
major or minor disputes, there is a third possibility. Section 5 of
the RLA grants the Mediation Board jurisdiction over major
disputes as well as "any other dispute" which is not referable to
the Adjustment Board.17 4 Perhaps the proper statutory interpretation is to treat disputes which are neither major nor minor
as major disputes under section 5. Even this approach is not free
from difficulty. It has been asserted that the statute restricts the
Board's jurisdiction to a dispute between a carrier and its employees.175 In addition, even if section 5 applies, a definite loophole exists. 17 6 For such disputes, no section 6 notice is required
with its thirty-day "cooling-off" provision and its requirement
of conferences. Only at the end of a unsuccessful mediation
would the union be under a restraint not to strike for thirty
177
days.
A final rationale offered by some courts is that, if a dispute is
neither major nor minor within the meaning of the RLA, then
no labor dispute is involved within the meaning of either the
RLA or Norris-La Guardia. 178 After having found these two
federal laws inapplicable to the dispute, the court finds some
jurisdictional basis for an injunction-usually a general provision of a transportation act1

9

This approach construes the scope

of the Norris-La Guardia Act as identical to the scope of the
RLA and ignores the fact that "labor dispute" is defined more
broadly in Norris-La Guardia than in the RLA.1 80
The Supreme Court had these approaches before it in the case
of Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line
173. See Comment, .upra note 170 at 937; 42
McGuinn, supra note 107, at 72-73.

WAsH.

L. REv. 935, 942;

174. 45 U.S.C. § 155 (First) (1954).

175. Comment, supra note 170, at 933. In this connection, the Adjustment
Board has only recently been held to have jurisdiction over a tri-party dispute. See Transportation-Communication Employees Union v. Union Pac.
R.R., 385 U.S. 157 (1966). But this case involved a jurisdictional dispute and
so the contending unionists were still employees.
176. See McGuinn, supra note 107, at 67.
177. Section 5, First (b) provides that the services of the Mediation Board
may be invoked in "any other dispute not referable to the National Railroad
Adjustment Board and not adjusted in conference between the parties or
where conferences are refused."
178. Lakefront Dock & R.R. Terminal Co. v. International Longshoremen's
Ass'n, 333 F.2d 549 (6th Cir. 1964); American Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line
Pilots Ass'n, 187 F. Supp. 643 (N.D. IIl. 1960).
179. See Comment, supra note 170, at 939; McGuinn, supra note 107, at 72.
180. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 113 (c) (1965) with 45 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1954).
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R.R.'8 ' There, after the major dispute bargaining procedures
had been exhausted, the BRT picketed a terminal to force the
terminal to stop providing facilities to the railroad. The court of
appeals recognized that a primary dispute over work rules existed between the railroad and the BRT, but its inquiry concerned only the secondary boycott. The court deemed the issue
to be whether the phrase, "case involving or growing out of any
labor dispute," 18 2 included secondary boycotts. The court conceded that a literal interpretation would include secondary boycotts, but held that "traditional economic self-interest justification concepts . . . are applicable to determine the intended scope

of Norris-La Guardia protection." 83 After having found such
an interest, the court denied the injunction, and the Supreme
Court affirmed by a 4-4 split among the justices. The Court's
division on the issue has been explained on the ground that a
majority of the Court was not willing to recognize Norris-La
84
Guardia's application to railroad secondary boycotts.1
While that litigation was pending in the federal courts, the
terminal company secured an injunction in a state court that
barred picketing except at a reserved gate designated for the sole
use of the railroad employees. The Supreme Court granted certioraxi and in a 4-3 decision held:
In short, we have been furnished by Congress neither
usable standards nor access to administrative expertise
in a situation where both are required. In these circumstances there is no really satisfactory judicial solution
to the problem at hand. However, we conclude that the
least unsatisfactory one is to allow parties who have
unsuccessfully exhausted the Railway Labor Act's procedures for resolution of a major dispute to employ the
full range of whatever peaceful economic power they
can muster, so long as its use conflicts with no other
obligation imposed by federal law. Hence, until Congress acts, picketing-whether characterized as primary
or secondary-must be deemed conduct protected
against state proscription. [citations omitted] Any
181. 362 F2d 649 (5th Cir.), aj'd per curiam by equally divided court, 385
U.S. 20 (1966).
182. Norris-La Guardia Act § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1965).

183. 362 F.2d at 654. This test is a substantial deviation from orthodox
interpretations, which usually compare the conduct with the language of the
statute. See 42 WAsH. L. REv. 935, 936-37 (1967).

184. 42 WASH. L. Rxv. 935, 940 (1967).
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other solution-apart from the rejected one of holding
that no conduct is protected-would involve the courts
once again in a venture for which they are institutionally unsuited.18, 5
It thus appears that the primary employer will be able to get
injunctive relief until the major dispute bargaining procedures
are exhausted, but that the neutral employer will not even have
this device. Although it seems incongrous to disallow secondary
boycotts in less crucial industries under the NLRA while allowing them in railroad disputes, perhaps the Supreme Court was
correct in relegating to Congress the task of filling this statutory gap left by the RLA.
Strikes over unfavorable government regulation raise similar
issues to those involved in secondary boycotts. Those disputes
defy normal classification and, moreover, cannot be solved by
mediation under section 5. One party to the controversy, the
Government, is not present at the mediation, and one party to
the mediation, the carrier, is only an adversely affected neutral
who has no power to negotiate the controversy.1 88
G. Conoluding Observations on Nor'ris-La Guardia and the
Railway Labor Act
It would be informative at this time to again consider the
policies of the Norris-La Guardia Act 18 7 and to see how these

policies have been affected by the RLA.
First of all, the notion that law has no useful role to play in
labor relations is ended. By the imposition of legal rights and
duties, it has become clear that law is a vital part of the national
labor policy, not only in the organizational phase of labor relations but also in the negotiation and administration of collective
agreements.
Second, it is also clear after the RLA that the injunction has
at least a limited use as a remedy in labor relations.
The most important effects of the RLA, however, have to do
with the judicial formulation of labor policy and the objectives
test. The Norris-La Guardia Act abolished the objectives test by
making the legality of employee activities depend upon external
185, Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S.

369, 392-93 (1969).
186. See McGuinn, supra note 107, at 68-70. See also U.S. Steel Corp. v.
U.M.W., 74 L.R.R.M. 2611 (3d Cir. 1970); Western Air Lines v. Flight
Eng'rs, 194 F. Supp. 908 (S.D. Cal. 1961)
187. See note 33 mipra and accompanying text.
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conduct rather than the desirability or impropriety of their
goals.""' But it is clear under the RLA that the availability of
injunctive relief often depends upon the objective of the employee activity. Nevertheless, there is at least one important
distinction. Under the old practice, judges determined the lawfulness of a strike on their own views of social and economic
policy. Under the RLA, however, the lawfulness of the objectives has been determined by the legislature, presumably after
investigation of the full social and economic ramifications. The
danger in this process is that the courts may take the short step
from appraisal of objectives in terms of their own sense of
legitimacy. 8 9 This is especially dangerous in a statute like the
RLA, where there are unforeseen conflicts and omissions.
Many of these unfortunate results have occurred in states
which have enacted anti-injunction statutes modeled upon the
Norris-La Guardia Act.190 Even if these particular pitfalls are
avoided, there is a definite limitation in framing restrictions on
concerted activities in terms of their objective. When a union is
forbidden to strike for a specified purpose but is free to strike
for other purposes, the law may accomplish little more than to
put a premium on subterfuge. 191
IMT. Tam

NATIONAL LABOR REmATIoNs ACT

The Wagner Act, enacted only three years after Norris-La
Guardia, marked the return of law into labor relations, but was
generally confined to the organizational phase. In this enactment, Congress was keenly aware of the limitations of NorrisLa Guardia, and in section 10(h) 192 made it clear that, except
for the authority given to the circuit courts to enforce, modify,
or set aside orders of the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB), Norris-La Guardia remained in effect. 193
There is also a basic difference in the structure of the Wagner
Act and the RLA. The Wagner Act created an administrative
agency, the NLRB, to make binding adjudications on its obligations. Thus, the problems of accommodating Norris-La Guardia
188. See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1940).
189. Loeb, supra note 52, at 480.
190. See Cox, The Role of Law in Labor Disputes, 39 CORPELL L. Q. 592,

596-97 (1954).
191. Id.

192. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (h) (1935).
193. See Donnelly Garment Co. v. International Ladies' Garment Workers,

99 F2d 309, 315 (8th Cir. 1938).
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to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) are greatly different from those encountered under the RLA.
The 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA introduced
further federal restrictions and expressly permitted the limited
use of the labor injunction in cases in which that remedy had
previously been outlawed by Norris-La Guardia. It is said that
the revival of the labor injunction was a response to several deep
causes: distrust of the growing power of unions; resentment
toward labor's claim of immunity from regulation; the feeling
that Norris-La Guardia had gone too far in freeing even the
most undesirable activities from legal restriction. 19 However,
the legislative history of Taft-Hartley reveals a congressional
belief that Norris-La Guardia would remain in effect where not
specifically overruled. 195
A. Injunctions in Unfair Labor Practices
Under sections 10(j) and (1), the NLRB is empowered to seek
injunctions in the federal courts to restrain unfair labor practices committed by either an employer or a union.
Prior to the Taft-Hartley amendments, problems arose in some
cases in which a majority representative had been certified or in
which certification proceedings were pending. The question was
whether a court, upon the petition of a private party, could preserve the status quo by enjoining concerted activity of a rival
union which was seeking to compel recognition by the employer.
Except for two early cases, 196 the courts held that Norris-La
Guardia prohibited such an injunction. 197 These results placed
the employer in the predicament of either violating a statutory
duty or suffering economic loss. The Taft-Hartley amendments
provided relief by declaring such union activity an unfair labor
practice. 9 s More importantly, section 10(1) provides that when
a charge is received concerning alleged violations and when an
investigation gives "reasonable cause to believe such charge is
true and that a complaint should issue," the NLRB is required
194. See Cox, supra note 190, at 597-98; see also S. REP. No. 105, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1947).
195. See 2 NLRB

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELA-

ACT OF 1947 at 1365, 1396.
196. Union Premier Food Stores, Inc. v. Retail Food Clerks Union, 98 F.2d
821 (3rd Cir. 1938) ; Oberman & Co. v. United Garment Workers, 21 F. Supp.
20 (W.D. Mo. 1937).
197. E.g., United States v. Building & Constr. Trades Council, 313 U.S. 539
(1941). See also Fur Workers v. Fur Workers, 105 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd
per curiain, 308 U.S. 522 (1939) (union had been recognized by employer).
198. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b)(4)(c) (1947).
TIONS

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol22/iss5/2

36

1970]

Wimberly: The Labor Injunction--Past, Present, and Future

Tnm LABOR INJuxcnoN

to petition the appropriate district court for a temporary injunction pending final Board disposition. 199 Upon a finding of vioaltion, the Board is empowered to grant appropriate reliefincluding an order to cease and desist from the unlawful practice. 200 Besides jurisdictional disputes, section 10(1) applies to
secondary boycotts and was extended to "hot cargo" clauses and
"organizational picketing" by the 1959 Landrum-Griffin amendments.
Section 10(j) was added by Taft-Hartley because of the inability of the Board in some instances to correct unfair labor
practices until after substantial injury had been done. It authorizes the Board to petition a district court for "appropriate
temporary relief or restraining order" in respect to any unfair
labor practice, whether committed by an employer or a union,
after a Board complaint has been issued. 20 1
Although the Board has not formalized the criteria it employs
in deciding whether or not to petition for section 10 (j) relief, it
has suggested guidelines.
After stating that there are no rigid determinants and
that each case is to be decided on its individual merits,
the Board listed the following guidelines: (1) the clarity of the alleged violation; (2) the likelihood of a
business dispute's resulting in an extraordinary public
impact; (3) the presence of special remedy problems
that would not be solved by a final Board order absent
interim relief; (4) flagrant disregard for the Board's
procedures; (5) the continuous or repetitious nature of
the alleged violation; (6) the threat of the alleged violation to the public order; and (7) the timeliness of the
20 2
request for relief.
In acting on the 10(j) petition, the district court will grant
relief it deems to be "just and proper." 20 3 If the district court
should decline to issue such an injunction, only the Board may
199. 29 U.S.C., § 160(1) (1947).
200. 294 U.S.C., § 160(c) (1935).

201. 29 U.S.C., § 160 (1)(1947).

202. See Note, Temporary Injunctions Under Section 10() of the TaftHartley Act, 44 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 181, 192 (1969), citing Fusco v. Richard W.
Kaase Baking Co., 205 F. Supp. 465, 478 (N.D. Ohio 1962).
203. There has been some disagreement as to the appropriate function of a
district court in passing on a Section 10(j) petition. See generally Note, Tenporary Injunctions Under Section 10(l)of the Taft-Hartley Act, supra note
202. Only in rare instances has a court seen fit to refuse to grant a section
10(l) injunction.
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appeal from the denial. 20 4 The district court injunction Will

terminate at the time the Board resolves the dispute on the
205

merits.

B. Other Injunctions Under the NLRA
Injunctions are authorized under Taft-Hartley against strikes
and lock-outs imperiling the national health and safety. However, such injunctive relief is only allowed for a period of eighty
20 6
days and only upon the discretionary order of the President.
Although the NLRA is silent on the matter of racial discrimination in collective bargaining, the Supreme Court has
acknowledged that the Steele doctrine is equally applicable
under the NLRA. 20 7 The next question is whether the relief

against breach of the duty of fair representation by a union
subject to the NLRA is to be obtained by private action or in
unfair labor practice proceedings. 20 8 Although it has not been
finally determined whether the breach of the duty of fair
representation is an unfair labor practice, 200 the Supreme Court

has stated that such actions may be brought in state or federal
courts by private parties. 210 It thus appears that, under the

NLRA, Norris-La Guardia will not prohibit injunctions forbidding the union from carrying on such unlawful arrangements.
0. Concluding Observations:Norris-Ea Guardia and the NLRA
With the exception of injunctive relief under the duty of fair
representation, the task of accommodating the anti-injunctive
policy of Norris-La Guardia with the NLRA has been assumed
by Congress.
Although the NLRA revived the use of the labor injunction,
steps were taken to insure that the abuses which led to the
enactment of Norris-La Guardia did not reappear. The most
important change was allowing injunctions only upon the petitioning for an injunction; the Board is charged with the duty
of making preliminary findings of fact and law. The courts
204. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpet Layers, 410 F2d 1148 (10th Cir.
1969), aff'd on other grounds, 397 U.S. 655 (1970).
205. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpet Layers, 397 U.S. 655 (1970).

206. See 29 U.S.C. § 176-80 (1965).

207. See Syres v. Oil Workers Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1955).
208. See generally Aaron, supra note 83; Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. Rav. 151, 172-74 (1957).
209. Compare Miranda Fuel Co., 140 NLRB 181 (1962), enforcement
denied, 326 F2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963), with Local 12, United Rubber Workers
v. NLRB, 368 F. 2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
210. See Vaca v. Sikes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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relief under the NLRA in
have consistently denied injunctive
211
parties.
private
by
brought
suits
There were some interesting findings made in 1961 by a Congressional Subcommittee under the chairmanship of Congressman Pucinski concerning the use of injunctions under the
NLRA. The Subcommittee not only did not recommend the
repeal of the injunctive provisions but recommended greater use
of the 10(j) injunction. It did recommend, however, that section
10(1) "permit" rather than "require" the Board to seek an
injunction and criticized the Board for using its discretionary
authority almost exclusively against unions. 212 Similar findings
were made slightly earlier by an advisory panel appointed by the
on the Organization and Procedure
Senate Labor 2Subcommittee
13
of the NLRB.
IV. Iw-uNcTIomS UNDmm SEcTioN 301 oF THE

NLRA

At the time of the Taft-Hartley amendments, the enforcement
of labor contracts rested solely in the hands of state courts,
214
except in cases where federal diversity jurisdiction existed.
This reservation of authority in state courts resulted in an
imbalance in the enforcement of such contracts, since the diverse
common law rules resulted in severe procedural obstacles to
unions being sued. 215 Therefore, in enacting section 301, making
suits for violations of collective bargaining agreements between
employers and labor organizations actionable within the federal
courts, it appears that Congress's primary purpose was to re216
move these defects.

It became inevitable that this policy, expressed in section 301,
of enforcing collective bargaining agreements would come into
conflict with the anti-injunctive policy of Norris-La Guardia.
Although section 301 was enacted as part of the NLRA by the
211. See Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Dixie Motor Coach
Corp., 170 F.2d 902 (8th Cir. 1948) (employer against union) ; Amazon Cot-

ton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers, 167 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1948) (union against
employer).

212. See McCulloch, mipra note 14, at 84-100; Aaron, supra note 52, at
326-27.
213. Id.

214. See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-18 (1947).
215. See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 487-88, 490-92, 496,
498-99, 503-04, 514, 530, 532, 534 (1958) and cases cited therein (appendix to
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent).
216. See S. REP. No. 105, supra note 214, at 15-17; H.R. REP'. No. 245, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 45-46 (1947).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

39

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 5 [2020], Art. 2
SouTH CAROLiNA LAw RLvinw
[Vol. 2

Taft-Hartley amendments, it is helpful to consider this question
separately because of the different problems presented.
A. Relevant Background Case Law Under Section 301
Soon after the enactment of section 301, questions were raised
as to its scope and constitutionality. The difficulty lay in the
fact that, on its face, section 301 appeared to be exclusively
jurisdictional without embodying any federal substantive rights.
The confusion was cleared with the Textile Workers v. Lincoln
Mills 21 7 decision in 1957, in which the Supreme Court made two
significant determinations: first, that Section 301 carried substantive content, in that it impliedly authorized federal courts
to "fashion a body of Federal law for the enforcement of ...
collective bargaining agreements" 218 ; and, second, that the
Norris-La Guardia Act did not prevent federal courts from
compelling arbitration if the labor contract so provided. With
respect to Norris-La Guardia, the Court reasoned that the "kinds
of acts which had given rise to abuse of the power to enjoin,"21 9
which are listed in section 4, did not include the failure to
arbitrate. Moreover, since
"section 8 of the Norris-La Guardia Act ... indicates
a congressional policy toward settlement of labor disputes by arbitration, . . . there is no reason to submit
,2
them to the requirements of section 7 ....

The next question was the effect of this holding on the state
courts. In Charles Dowd Bow Co. 'v. Courtney,221 the Court rejected the proposition that section 301 pre-empted state jurisdiction and held that state jurisdiction and federal jurisdiction are
concurrent. It pointed out that section 301 was intended to increase enforceability of such agreements, and that this objective
would be served by viewing it as supplementing state jurisdiction.
Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co. 222 elaborated on the above

principles and held that, while both federal and state courts have
jurisdiction over such cases, federal substantive law must be
applied to insure uniformity throughout the judicial system.
217. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
218. Id. at 451.

219. Id. at 458.
220. Id. at 458-59.
221. 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
222. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
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B. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson
The Lincoln Mills opinion announced that arbitration is the
quid pro quo for the no-strike clause, so the question arose that,
if the equity powers of the federal courts could be used to compel arbitration notwithstanding Norris-La Guardia, could the
same powers be used to enforce the other end of the quid pro quo
-the no-strike clause? This problem involved conduct specifically immunized by section 4.
This question was presented in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson,2 23 where the majority of the Supreme Court considered the
issue to be whether section 301 impliedly repealed section 4. Mr.
Justice Black first concluded that this was a "labor dispute"
within the terms of section 13 of Norris-La Guardia, and therefore, the federal courts lack jurisdiction to enter an injunction
unless the scope of the Act has been narrowed by the subsequent
enactment of section 301. The Court found in the legislative
history of section 301 proof that Congress had expressly rejected
the proposal to repeal Norris-La Guardia, and reasoned that, if
Congress had so intended, it would have specifically done so, as
it did in other sections of Taft-Hartley. Chicago River was
distinguished as a situation involving a strike called by the
union in defiance of an affirmative duty to submit to compulsory arbitration, whereas under the NLRA such procedures
are consensual.
In a powerful dissent, Mr. Justice Brennan argued that there
should be a judicial accommodation of the two acts, and, on that
basis, an injunction should be allowed.
Regardless of the statutory interpretation, the Sinclair result
presents many serious problems to the national labor policy. In
the famous arbitration trilogy, 224 the Supreme Court expressed

a federal policy strongly favoring the resolution of labor disputes by arbitration. But, dissenting in Sinclair, Justice Brennan
remarked that
"since unions cannot be enjoined by a Federal court
from striking in open defiance of their undertaking to
arbitrate, employers will pause long before committing
themselves to obligations enforceable against them but
not against their unions. 2 25
223. 370 U.S. 195 (1962).

224. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
225. 370 U.S. at 227.
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Technically, employers still had access to other remedies for
union breach of a no-strike clause such as compelling the union
to arbitrate, damages, and discipline and discharge of employees.
Against this, it is suggested that the functioning of the arbitration process itself is marred by the coexistence of a strike, that
money damages are inadequate, and that, as a practical matter,
the employer is more interested in strike settlement than retaliation.220 Indeed, if there was an adequate remedy at law, courts

would presumably not grant injunctions, since equitable relief is
predicated on the lack of adequate legal redress.
Perhaps the undesirability of the result is best indicated by
the Sinclair majority opinion's admission that an injunction
would be both desirable and necessary.
The Sinclair case was followed by a great deal of comment as
to its correctness. Most of the comment was critical,2 2 7 and in
1963 the Section of Labor Law of the American Bar Association
22 8
adopted a resolution calling for Congress to undo the decision,
and bills to implement the resolution were introduced in several
22 9
sessions of Congress.
C. Between Sinclair and Boys Market
Since employers could no longer get injunctive relief in federal courts for breaches of no-strike clauses, they turned to the
state courts for such relief. Norris-La Guardia is directed by its
express terms to the federal courts, and it is clear from the
legislative history of section 301 that Congress did not intend by
its enactment to eliminate any previously existing state court
jurisdiction. 2 0 Thus, the first important question left in the
wake of Sinclair was whether Norris-La Guardia was now part
of the federal common law of section 301 and, therefore, to be
applied by the states in keeping with the uniformity rationale
of Lucas Flour, despite section 301's clear purpose to increase the
effective enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.
The vast majority of state courts which considered the question decided that they had the power in section 301 suits to
226. See Boys Market v. Retail Clerk's Union, 398 U.S. 235, 248-49 (1970).
227. See, e.g., Aaron, Strikes in Breach of Collective Agreement: Some
Unanswered Questions, 63 COLum. L. REv. 1027 (1963).
228. See 1963

PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN

BAR ASSOCIATION,

LABOR

Part II, 226.
229. See S. REP. No. 2455, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); H.R. REP. No.
6080, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); H.R. REP. No. 12127, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
RELATIONS LAW,

(1964).

230. See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507-12 (1962).
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enjoin breach of contract strikes,231 and today it is settled that
23 2
Norris-La Guardia does not apply to such actions.
However, the unions were not so easily outdone. They
promptly began to remove such state court action to federal
courts, which under Sinclair may not issue injunctions. The issue
then arose whether state court injunction actions were removable
to federal courts, since Norris-La Guardia deprives the federal
courts of "jurisdiction" to issue injunctions. This question was
answered in Avco Co'p. v. Lodge 735, IAM2 33
where the Court held that claims under collective bargaining agreements arise under the "laws of the United
'States" and that these suits are within the "original
jurisdiction" of the district courts. The Court explained
the fact that federal courts have no jurisdiction to issue
injunctive relief in these circumstances by noting that
the ".

.

. nature of the relief available after jurisdiction

attaches is, of course, different from the question
whether there is jurisdiction to adjudicate the contro4
versy.'12 3
There was another interesting point in the Aveo case. Justice
Stewart, who was in the 5-3 majority in Sinclair, stated in
reference to the accommodation issue: "Accordingly, the Court
expressly reserves decision on the effect of Sinclair in the circumstances presented by this case. The Court will, no doubt, have
an opportunity to reconsider the scope and continuing validity
235
of Sinclair upon an appropriate future occasion."
The employer, thus far frustrated in his attempts to secure
injunctions against breaches of no-strike clauses, turned to other
devices to attain this end result. In Sinclair, the injunction was
sought before arbitration was invoked. In view of the national
labor policy favoring arbitration, even expressed by the Norris231. The leading case on this point is McCarroll v. Los Angeles County
Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 61, 315 P2d 322, 332 (1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958).
232. See Boys Market v. Retail Clerk's Union, 398 U.S. 235, 247 (1970)
(dictum).
233. 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
234. Id. at 561. The Court in Avco left open the question of what efficacy,
if any, the state court injunction has after removal. 390 U.S. at 561 n.4. They
have subsequently indicated, however, that dissolution of the state injunction
would have been required. See General Electric Co. v. Local Union 191, 413
F.2d 964 (5th Cir. 1969), cited it Boys Market v. Retail Clerk's Union, 398
U.S. 235, 244 (1970).
235. 390 U.S. at 562.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

43

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 5 [2020], Art. 2
[Vol. 9,2
SouTr C oiNA LAw REvio w

La Guardia Act itself,236 what is the status of a suit to seek
enforcement of an arbitrator's award, and, as an aspect of that
enforcement, an order not to strike in protest against it ?
The Third Circuit, in PhiladelphiaMarine Trade Association
v. InternationaZ Longshoremen's Association, 37 allowed an injunction under these circumstances. The court classified the
order as the specific performance of a contract rather than an
injunction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, but did not
reach the ultimate issue, instead holding that the particular
award was unenforceable because of the impreciseness of the
order. This "impreciseness" rationale merely paved the way for
further confusion, for it was predicated upon a federal proced238
ural rule requiring preciseness in drafting injunctive relief.
Sinclair held that Norris-La Guardia does not impair the
right of an employer to obtain an order "in the nature of an
injunction" compelling arbitration under the provisions of a
collective bargaining agreement. 23 9 A slightly different approach would be a provision giving power to an arbitratorto
order an end to a work stoppage-an order that might then be
judicially enforced. In this situation, the judgment of the arbitrator is precisely what the parties intended when they executed
the agreement, and, in the words of the Supreme Court, "The
moving party should not be deprived of the arbitrator's judgment, when it was his judgment and all that it connotes that was
bargained for."240 The Fifth Circuit endorsed this approach in
New Orleans Steamship Association v. General Longshore
Vorkers.2 41 The court distinguished Sinclair "on the more than
236. Section 8 provides that no injunctive relief shall issue unless the party
requesting it has made "every reasonable effort to settle such dispute either by
negotiation or with the aid of any available governmental machinery of mediation or voluntary arbitration." While section 8 is technically an additional
prerequisite to relief and does not limit the broad provisions of section 4, it
nevertheless envisages the possibility that disputes may be settled by arbitration
and embodies a congressional policy favoring arbitration. Dannet, Norris-La
Guardia and Injunctions in Labor Arbitration Cases, New York University

Proceedings of Sixteenth Annual Conference on Labor 275, 285 (1964).
237. 365 F.2d 295 (3d Cir. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 389 U.S. 64

(1967).

238. See 389 U.S. at 75.
239. The dissent in Sinclair points out that an order compelling arbitration
may have much the same effect as an injunction for "a strike in face of such
an order would risk a charge of contempt." 370 U.S. at 227 n.23. Apparently,
no court has yet applied this theory.
240. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564,
568 (1960).
241. 389 F.2d 369 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 828 (1968); contra,
Marine Transport Lines v. Curran, 65 L.R.R.M. 2095 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)
("whatever the form of the proceedings, the court [was] being asked to enjoin
a work stoppage").
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semantical ground that there is a real difference between an
ordinary injunction and an order enforcing the award of an
242
arbitrator although end result is the same.1

Less obvious devices were suggestions 243 of the revival of the
doctrines developed in Cates v. Allen,244 which remanded a suit

to the state court since the federal court had no jurisdiction in
equity, and Vestmoreland Coal Uo.,246 which held that an arbitrator's award became part of the contract itself and a strike in
protest of the award without first complying with the requirements of section 8(d) of the NLRA constituted a refusal to
246
bargain. A final suggestion, mentioned by Professor Aaron,
is to incorporate a no-removal clause in the collective bargaining
agreement.
D. Boys Market and Beyond
Many of these arguments were before the Supreme Court in
Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union,247 where Justice Stewart's concurring remark expressing uncertainty regarding the
242. 389 F.2d at 372.
243. These cases were brought to the writer's attention by an interview with
David Shapiro, Professor of Law, Harvard University, in Cambridge, May 1,
1969.
244. 149 U.S. 451 (1892). In Cates, the plaintiffs were simple contract
creditors who had not reduced their claims to judgment, and suit was brought
in state court to set aside fraudulent conveyances. The suit was removed to a
federal court on the ground of diverse citizenship. State law permitted blended
legal and equitable remedies, but under the then applicable federal law, the
federal courts had no equitable jurisdiction of such a suit. The court held that,
when a suit over which a state court has full jurisdiction in equity is removed
to a federal court on the ground of diverse citizenship, and the federal courts
have no jurisdiction in equity over such a controversy, the cause should be
remanded to the state court, instead of dismissing it for want of jurisdiction.
The Cates case was decided prior to the promulgation of the present rules of
civil procedure, a reason which accounts for the fact that the doctrine has not
been recently applied. See Texas Employers Ass'n v. Felt, 150 F.2d 227, 231
n.14 (5th Cir. 1945).
245. 117 N.L.R.B. 1072 (1957), enforcement denied on other grounds, 258
F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1958). Since section 8(b) (3) of the NLRA makes it an
unfair labor practice for a union to refuse to bargain with an employer, it is
conceivable that a strike in breach of a collective bargaining agreement might
be enjoined by the NLRB as a "refusal to bargain." The NLRB in 1961, however, relying heavily on the Insrance Agents case, expressly ruled that a
strike in breach of a no-strike clause does not constitute a refusal to bargain.
Lumber & Sawmill Workers, 130 N.L.R.B. 235 (1961). Nevertheless, the
earlier Westmoreland case may have survived that pronouncement. See also
Sheet Metal Workers, 153 N.L.R.B. 50 (1965).
246. See Aaron, The Strike and the Injunction-Problems of Remand and
Removal, New York University, Proceedings of Eighteenth Annual Conference on Labor 93, 102-03 (1966). Professor Aaron discusses several insurance
cases and concludes that such provisions would be contrary to public policy.
See also United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 150
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (demand for such a provision not a refusal to bargain).
247. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
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continuing validity of Sinclair was finally vented. In a 5-2
decision authored by Justice Brennan, which is substantially an
adoption of the Justice's dissent in Sinclair, the Court reasons:
It is substantially because Sinclair stands as a significant departure from our otherwise consistent emphasis
upon the congressional policy to promote the peaceful
settlement of labor disputes through arbitration and our
efforts to accommodate and harmonize this policy with
those underlying the anti-injunction provisions of the
Norris-La Guardia Act that we believe Sinclair should
248
be reconsidered.
The court discussed the anomaly of the state court jurisdiction
question and the devastating consequences toward the federal
labor policy favoring arbitration. The Court stated its task in
terms of how to accommodate "the literal terms of § 4 of the
Norris-La Guardia Act" to "Section 301(a) . . .and the purposes of arbitration 249 and concluded that
the unavailability of equitable relief in the arbitration
context presents a serious impediment to the congressional policy favoring the voluntary establishment of a
mechanism for the peaceful resolution of labor disputes,
that the core purpose of the Norris-La Guardia Act is
not sacrificed by the limited use of equitable remedies to
further this important policy, and consequently that the
Norris-La Guardia Act does not bar the granting of
injunctive relief in the circumstances of the instant
0
case. 25
The Court then proceeded to limit its holding:
We deal only with the situation in which a collective
bargaining contract contains a mandatory grievance
adjustment or 25 ' arbitration procedure. Nor does it fol-

low from what we have said that injunctive relief is
appropriate as a matter of course in every case - of a
strike over an arbitrable grievance . .

.

.When a strike

is sought to be enjoined because it is over a grievance
248. Id. at 241.

249. Id. at 250.
250. Id. at 253.
251. The question has been raised whether this statement in the alternative

was deliberate. Does it mean that the result would be the same if there was
a binding third party arbitration procedure but only a mandatory grievance

not

adjustment procedure? F. Anderson, The Right to Strike and the Arbitration

Clause, Epilogue, May 26, 1970 (unpublished).
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which both252 parties are contractually bound to arbi-

trate, the District Court may issue no injunctive order
until it first holds that the contract does have that
effect; and the employer should be ordered to arbitrate
as a condition of his obtaining an injunction against the
strike. Beyond this, the District Court must, of course,
consider whether issuance of an injunction would be
253
warranted under ordinary principles of equity ....
Unfortunately, the Boys Market decision still left several
questions unanswered. Although the case concerned a contract
with an express no-strike clause, the implication -was that the
Court would have implied a promise by the union not to strike
in response to an arbitrable dispute. 25 4 But the Court did not
deal with the situation 'where the strike is over a dispute 'which
is not arbitrable, such as 'where the purpose of the strike is to
change the contract, or in support of a demand dealing with a
subject not covered by the contract, or involving a subject
expressly excluded from arbitration. 255 It is submitted that the
Court's emphasis on arbitration leads to the conclusion that in
the above areas the employer would be relegated to his traditional legal remedies. Boys Market did not say that a strike in
breach of a no-strike clause could be enjoined in all instances;
the holding was limited to the situation where the union had an
arbitration remedy for its grievance.
What about the situation, analogous to cases arising under the
RLA,256 where the union goes out on strike over a grievance
which has not yet been carried through the parties own grievance procedure? The rationale of Boys Market should still apply
as long as the employer is exerting every reasonable effort to
proceed with the grievance procedure and arbitration. 25 7 A strike
at this stage of the game would be just as detrimental to the
federal policy favoring arbitration as one at the later stage.
252. This verbalism leaves open the question whether the decision would

have been the same if the arbitration clause was of the type in which only the
union could demand arbitration. This situation should not make a difference,
since the union is the critical party since it is the one waiving its right to
strike.
253. 398 U.S. at 253-54.
254. See 398 U.S. at 248.
255. F. Anderson, .supranote 251.
256. See note 95 supra and accompanying text.
257. Cf. 398 U.S. at 254: "[T]he petitioner was ready to proceed with
arbitration at the time an injunction against the strike was sought... ..
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E. Concluding Observations:Nortis-La Guardiaand Section 301
As can readily be seen, the original policy in the Norris-La
Guardia Act that the judiciary served no useful function in
labor disputes was reversed by Lincoln Mills. Indeed, federal law
under section 301 is to be fashioned from the policy of our
national labor laws by "judicial inventiveness."
The Boys Market holding has little possibility of reviving the
old pre-1932 dangers. The injunction remedy would be regulated
by the parties' own contract and available only to further a
congressionaZ policy. There is little danger of judicial policymaking in this regard, since the policy predilections of a court
have little influence in deciding an issue based on the express
terms of a contract. Moreover, the holding actually furthers the
express policy of the Norris-La Guardia Act of providing for
"actual liberty of contract" by means of collective bargaining.
Of course there is always the risk that a judge will act on the
hasty premise that, because a strike occurs during a contract
term and the contract provides for arbitration, it is presumptively enjoinable. Furthermore, the questions involved as to
whether the grievance is arbitrable and whether the work stoppage is in support of the grievance are by no means easy.
V. CONCLUSION
Although it is now well settled that law has an important role
in labor relations, Professor Archibald Cox suggests that
in the final analysis . . . the development of legal rules
of conduct in labor relations involves striking a balance-a balance between the need for regulation and the
what the law can do and its
value of freedom, between
28
inherent limitations.
Whenever possible, the law should encourage private machinery
for settling disputes, and should only intrude into areas where
the overwhelming consensus of opinion condemns the unlawful
conduct. The reason is that the effectiveness of law depends upon
its acceptance of the governed. So long as feelings run high on
any issue, some work stoppages will be inevitable regardless of
the legal rules. It has been demonstrated in the public employment field that, no matter what type of restraints are provided,
there is no statute or order that can effectively restrain the em258. Cox, spra note 190, at 604.
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ployees when they feel they are not getting the justice they
desire.
This is not to suggest that legal rules are not needed in many
aspects of labor-management relations. Moreover, the labor
injunction has proved to be the most efficient means of enforcing labor laws in certain types of situations. Labor leaders need
not fear that the limited use of the labor injunction will lead to
another era of "government by injunction." The economic, social,
and political changes in the country have made such a return
impossible. "Government by injunction" really meant that judges
should not establish labor policy by enjoining conduct they
found undesirable. But, since 1934, two years after the enactment of the Norris-La Guardia Act, the legislature has spoken
and announced labor policy. Indeed, today, the injunction is
often used by labor to compel employers to obey the law.
One of the evils of the pre-Norris-La Guardia labor injunction
was that it prohibited self-help but provided no solution to the
underlying problem. Today, the rights of workers to organize
and to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing has become firmly established as the basis of our labor
policy. The declaration of policy in the Norris-La Guardia Act
itself indicates that, to some extent, the across-the-board denial
of injunctions in labor disputes is unnecessary today:
[U]nder prevailing economic conditions, developed
with the aid of governmental authority for owners of
property... the individual unorganized workers is
commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract . . . it is necessary that he have full freedom of

association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing, to259negotiate the terms
and conditions of his employment.
As the Supreme Court remarked in Boys Market, "[Tihe Norris-La Guardia Act was responsive to
a situation totally dif260
ferent from that which exists today. 1

259. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 102 (emphasis added).
260. 398 U.S. at 250.
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